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ABSTRACT
On June 1, 2017, President Donald Trump announced that the
United States would withdraw from the Paris Agreement on
Climate Change. The United States, the biggest producer of carbon
dioxide in history, was actively involved in the negotiation and
approval of the Agreement. Most considered the Paris Agreement
an overall success, and it was cited as the only effective institutional
solution to climate change. According to its legal framework, the
U.S.’s nationally determined contribution (NDC) required the
country only to continue its trend on reducing carbon emissions. As
such, the United States’ withdrawal was a contentious topic even
between members of the Trump administration. CEOs of major U.S.
companies and members of both political parties criticized the
decision, so did world leaders. In light of this controversy, this
Article assesses the domestic and international costs and benefits of
the withdrawal to the United States. The baseline for comparison is
the period during which the United States was party to the
Agreement, including the benefits accrued. Accordingly, this
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Article focuses on the cost-benefit analysis of the withdrawal itself—
not on the existence of the Agreement.
From a theoretical perspective, this Article fills a void in the
international environmental law literature, because to date no
studies on the cost-benefit analysis of the withdrawal have been
published. In addition, it contributes to the environmental law
literature because it addresses a contemporary example of a public
policy enacted without the normative use of economics, one that
disregarded cost-benefit analysis as a methodological tool for
maximizing U.S. overall well-being. This research is particularly
relevant due to the significant increase of U.S. carbon dioxide
emissions in 2018, and the limited improvement in global energy
efficiency that year. This Article also advances a trending topic on
climate change studies, because it is the first to research the current
U.S. litigation on the Paris Agreement specifically. Moreover, it
provides unique arguments to be used in future litigation and policy
assessments.
This Article is organized as follows: Part I provides an overview
of the Paris Agreement and the U.S. withdrawal, establishing
foundational concepts to be addressed. Part II presents a costbenefit analysis of such withdrawal, focusing on the manner in
which it was decided, and finds evidence that it was not reasoned.
The Article argues that this unreasoned approach increases legal
uncertainty, contributing to an increase in litigation. Part III
addresses the costs and benefits of the withdrawal based on its
substantive terms, i.e., its merits. It assesses the quantitative and
qualitative effects of the withdrawal for the United States, and
related challenges. Likewise, it considers the international impact of
such a withdrawal for the country. Part IV concludes that the U.S.
withdrawal does not pass the comprehensive cost-benefit test
developed in this Article.
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I. INTRODUCTION
On June 1, 2017, U.S. President Donald Trump announced the
country would withdraw from the Paris Agreement on Climate
Change.1 The United States, the largest emitter of carbon dioxide in
history,2 was actively involved in the negotiation and approval of
this Agreement. 3 Most consider the Paris Agreement an overall
success, 4 and it is often cited as “perhaps, the only, effective
institutional response to climate change.” 5 According to its legal

1
Donald J. Trump, President of the U.S., Statement by President Trump on
the Paris Climate Accord (June 1, 2017), https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefingsstatements/statement-president-trump-paris-climate-accord/
[https://perma.cc/5DJ2-39JD]. For an overview on the Paris Agreement, see Izzet
Ari & Ramazan Sari, Differentiation of Developed and Developing Countries for the Paris
Agreement, 18 ENERGY STRATEGY REV. 175, 181 (2017) (emphasizing the need to
develop an international agreement meant to combat climate change that accounts
for the differences in carbon emissions between developed and developing
countries).
2
For historical data since 1850, see Justin Gillis & Nadja Popovich, The U.S. is
the Biggest Carbon Polluter in History. It Just Walked Away From the Paris Climate Deal.,
TIMES
(June
1,
2017),
N.Y.
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/06/01/climate/us-biggest-carbonpolluter-in-history-will-it-walk-away-from-the-paris-climate-deal.html
[https://perma.cc/EH32-CGV9]. For data on current emissions and per capita
contributions to the Paris Agreement, see Table 2 in Appendix I.
3
Barack Obama, President of the U.S., Statement by the President on the Paris
Climate Agreement (Dec. 12, 2015), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/thepress-office/2015/12/12/us-leadership-and-historic-paris-agreement-combatclimate-change [https://perma.cc/C5TA-LK98]. President Obama committed the
United States to a 26% to 28% reduction of the 2005 levels of GHG emissions by
2025. See Fact Sheet: U.S. Reports its 2025 Emissions Target to the UNFCCC, OFF. OF
THE PRESS SEC’Y (Mar. 31, 2015), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-pressoffice/2015/03/31/fact-sheet-us-reports-its-2025-emissions-target-unfccc
[https://perma.cc/4AZW-3AG3].
4
See Maria L. Banda, The Bottom-Up Alternative: The Mitigation Potential of
Private Climate Governance After the Paris Agreement, 42 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 325, 327
(2018) (explaining how the Paris Agreement has “energized unprecedented
commitments by a wide range of non-State actors, including all levels of
government . . . as well as private citizens, companies, and civil society.”).
Environmentalists, however, consider the U.S. target modest. See, e.g., Luke Kemp,
Better out than in, 7 NATURE CLIMATE CHANGE 458, 458 (2017) (describing the U.S.’s
target under the Paris Agreement as “inadequate”).
5
Mark Cooper, Governing the Global Climate Commons: The Political Economy of
State and Local Action, After the U.S. Flip-Flop on the Paris Agreement, 118 ENERGY
POL’Y 440, 441 (2018).
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framework, the U.S. nationally determined contribution (“NDC”)6
requires only that the country continue its trend of reducing carbon
emissions. 7 As such, the U.S. withdrawal, which will likely take
effect in late 2020,8 was a contentious topic even within the Trump
administration.9 CEOs of major U.S. companies10 and members of
both political parties criticized the decision, 11 as did European

6
”Each Party shall prepare, communicate and maintain successive nationally
determined contributions that it intends to achieve. Parties shall pursue domestic
mitigation measures, with the aim of achieving the objectives of such
contributions.” U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change Conference of
Parties, Twenty-First Session, Adoption of the Paris Agreement, art. 4(2), U.N. Doc.
FCCC/CP/2015/L.9/Rev.1 (Dec. 12, 2015) [hereinafter Paris Agreement].
Nationally determined contributions (“NDCs”) are voluntary targets determined
by each country. Id.
7
See Dana Nuccitelli, Fact Check: China Pledged Bigger Climate Action than the
(Nov.
14,
2014),
USA;
Republican
Leaders
Wrong,
GUARDIAN
https://www.theguardian.com/environment/climate-consensus-97-percent/2014/nov/14/fact-check-china-pledged-bigger-climate-action-republicanleaders-wrong [https://perma.cc/E9BX-LEPN] (discussing President Barack
Obama’s pledge to reduce carbon pollution in 2014—prior to the signing of the
Paris Agreement).
8
Paris Agreement, supra note 6, art. 28 (outlining the withdrawal mechanism).
The Paris Agreement entered into force on November 4, 2016. Paris AgreementStatus of the Ratification, UNITED NATIONS FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE
CHANGE
(2020),
https://unfccc.int/process/the-paris-agreement/status-ofratification [https://perma.cc/RV8R-T8U2]. According to Article 28, the first date
for parties to validly withdraw was November 4, 2019. This was the exact date the
U.S. confirmed its intent to withdraw. See Lisa Friedman, Trump Serves Notice to
Quit
Paris
Climate
Agreement,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Nov.
4,
2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/04/climate/trump-paris-agreementclimate.html [https://perma.cc/P75U-NKKT].
9
Energy Secretary Rick Perry, former National Security Advisor H. R.
McMaster, former economic advisor Gary Cohn, and now-departed Secretary of
State Rex Tillerson were against the withdrawal. HAROLD HONGJU KOH, THE TRUMP
ADMINISTRATION AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 53 (2019).
10
See Richard Luscombe, Top U.S. Firms Including Walmart and Ford Oppose
(Dec.
1,
2017),
Trump
on
Climate
Change,
GUARDIAN
https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2017/dec/01/trump-climatechange-paris-withdrawal-ford-walmart [https://perma.cc/U48E-VN7S] (noting
the commitment of Walmart, General Motors, Ford, and Mars to sustainability and
their disappointment regarding the U.S.’s decision to withdraw from the Paris
Agreement).
11
See Philip Rucker & Jenna Johnson, Trump Announces U.S. Will Exit Paris
Climate Deal, Sparking Criticism at Home and Abroad, WASH. POST (June 1, 2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trump-to-announce-us-will-exitparis-climate-deal/2017/06/01/fbcb0196-46da-11e7-bcde624ad94170ab_story.html [https://perma.cc/L7X8-8AKT] (discussing the “deep
divide within the Trump administration over” the withdraw from the Paris Climate
Agreement).
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leaders. 12 In light of this controversy, the Article assesses the
domestic and international costs and benefits of withdrawal for the
United States. 13 The baseline for comparison is the period the
United States was party to the Agreement, including benefits
accrued. 14 Accordingly, this Article focuses on the cost-benefit
analysis of the withdrawal itself—not on the mere existence of the
Paris Agreement.
The comprehensive cost-benefit analysis
developed within the Article demonstrates the U.S. withdrawal is
not justified.15
Scientific consensus correlates climate change with global
warming, of which one human-induced cause is the accumulation
of greenhouse gases (GHGs) in the atmosphere.16 A primary goal of
12
In a joint statement, French President Emmanuel Macron, German
Chancellor Angela Merkel, and then-Italian Prime Minister Paolo Gentiloni
rebuked President Trump’s intention to renegotiate the Paris Agreement, stating:
“We deem the momentum generated in Paris in December 2015 irreversible and we
firmly believe that the Paris Agreement cannot be renegotiated, since it is a vital
instrument for our planet, societies and economies.” Paris Agreement Cannot be
Renegotiated, PERMANENT MISSION OF FR. TO THE UNITED NATIONS IN N.Y. (June 1,
2017),
https://onu.delegfrance.org/Paris-Agreement-cannot-be-renegotiated
[https://perma.cc/VW9B-7R26]. Moreover, the other 190 state parties to the Paris
Agreement have no incentive to renegotiate the treaty with a “flailing American
administration.” KOH, supra note 9, at 42.
13
Cost-benefit analysis is used as a technique to systematically assess the
“efficiency impacts” of policies. DAVID L. WEIMER & AIDAN R. VINING, POLICY
ANALYSIS: CONCEPTS AND PRACTICE 398 (Routledge 6th ed. 2017).
14
The Agreement entered into force on Nov. 4, 2016. Paris Agreement, supra
note 6, art. 21(1).
15
The costs are significant. A recent study on heat-related mortality avoided
from lowering current emissions in line with the Paris Agreement found that, with
a high degree of confidence and using conservative estimations, the United States
would avoid between 70 to 1980 annual heat-related deaths. Y. T. Eunice Lo et al.,
Increasing Mitigation Ambition to Meet the Paris Agreement’s Temperature Goal Avoids
Substantial Heat-Related Mortality in U.S. Cities, 5 SCI. ADVANCES 1, 6-8 (2019).
According to the EPA, natural disasters in 2017 (e.g., wildfires, floods, earthquakes,
hurricanes, tornadoes, winter storms) caused $306.2 billion in cumulative damages,
making the year the most expensive on record. The report also emphasizes that
climate change is expected to increase the frequency and intensity of such events.
See ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, PLANNING FOR NATURAL DISASTER DEBRIS
1
(Apr.
2019),
https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/201905/documents/final_pndd_guidance_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/3LY9-9X95].
16
The majority of the scientific community acknowledges the existence of
climate change, and that GHG emissions are a primary cause. See Richard S. J. Tol,
Quantifying the Consensus on Anthropogenic Global Warming in the Literature: A ReAnalysis, 73 ENERGY POL’Y 701 (2014) (discussing the position of various members
of the scientific community). See also Richard S. J. Tol, The Elusive Consensus on
Climate Change 8 (Univ. Sussex Bus. Sch., Working Paper Series No. 0319, 2019)
(noting that 97% of scientific studies point to human activity as the most important
factor in climate change since 1950).
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the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
(UNFCCC) is the stabilization of GHG emissions.17 One aim of the
Paris Agreement is to limit the global increase in mean temperature
well below 2°C compared to pre-industrial levels. 18 Because the
Agreement targets the reduction of GHGs, 19 it was a contentious
topic in the United States even before the country announced its
intent to withdraw.20 Despite the scientific consensus,21 preeminent
U.S. politicians remain skeptical about the existence of climate

17
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, U.N. Doc.
FCCC/INFORMAL/84 (May 9, 1992) [hereinafter UNFCCC]. The UNFCCC
entered into force on March 21, 1994. Id. art. 23. The scientific consensus regarding
the existence of climate change and the necessity of mitigation were paramount
considerations during UNFCCC negotiations. John Houghton, Science and
International Environmental Policy: The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, in
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, THE ECONOMY AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 353, 355-57
(Richard Revesz et al. eds., 2001).
18
”This Agreement, in enhancing the implementation of the Convention,
including its objective, aims to strengthen the global response to the threat of
climate change, in the context of sustainable development and efforts to eradicate
poverty, including by: (a) Holding the increase in the global average temperature
to well below 2°C above pre-industrial levels and pursuing efforts to limit the
temperature increase to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels, recognizing that this
would significantly reduce the risks and impacts of climate change.” Paris
Agreement, supra note 6, art. 2.
19
The Paris Agreement, with its goal of reducing GHGs, was negotiated
following the legal framework of the UNFCCC “a treaty with 196 state parties to
which the Senate gave its advice and consent in 1992.” See KOH, supra note 9, at 39.
20
Traditionally, coal producers and electric power companies have resisted
GHG regulation. For instance, American Electric Power (AEP), then the nation’s
largest electricity generator and consumer of coal, testified in Congress against
regulations. Elisabeth Smick, U.S. Companies and Greenhouse Gas Regulations,
COUNCIL
ON
FOREIGN
REL.
2
(Sept.
14,
2006),
https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/us-companies-and-greenhouse-gasregulations [https://perma.cc/7SX8-XHHA].
21
The EPA acknowledges that the combustion of fossil fuels is the “main
human activity” that emits carbon dioxide into the atmosphere. See Overview of
Greenhouse Gases, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY (Oct. 31, 2018),
https://www.epa.gov/ghgemissions/overview-greenhouse-gases#carbondioxide [https://perma.cc/GVJ8-S4XG]. But see Craig D. Idso et al., Climate Science,
in CLIMATE CHANGE RECONSIDERED II: FOSSIL FUELS 107, 109 (Joseph L. Bast & Diane
Carol Bast eds., 2019) (highlighting the reasons for disagreements among scientists
about the causes of climate change, including bias and lack of causation).
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change.22 The U.S. Congress, however, recognizes climate change as
a direct threat to national security.23
In light of this skepticism, a methodological note is required.
This research is based on the general law and economics
assumption—and a tenet of cost-benefit analysis—that regulation
should aim to increase overall well-being rather than economic
efficiency.24 In the climate change arena, the former is more suitable.
“Unregulated competitive markets can generate seriously excessive
amounts of residuals, including pollution, hazardous waste, and
other forms of environmental degradation.”25 These market failures
justify strong regulatory measures.26 Moreover, climate change is

22
President Trump claimed that global warming was “created by” China to
undermine the competitiveness of U.S. manufacturing. Donald J. Trump
(Nov.
6,
2012,
11:15
AM),
(@realDonaldTrump),
TWITTER
https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/265895292191248385
[https://perma.cc/7G5Q-5HWK]. His understanding contradicts the most recent
scientific report issued by a panel of experts from thirteen U.S. administrative
agencies. See Climate Science Special Report: Fourth National Climate Assessment, U.S.
GLOBAL
CHANGE
RESEARCH
PROGRAM
35-72
(2018),
https://www.globalchange.gov/nca4 [https://perma.cc/VC8G-XSEG] (“[The
report] concludes that the evidence of human-caused climate change is
overwhelming and continues to strengthen, that the impacts of climate change are
intensifying across the country, and that climate-related threats to Americans’
physical, social, and economic well-being are rising.“).
23
See National Defense Authorization Act For Fiscal Year 2018, Pub. L. No.
115-91, § 335, 131 Stat. 1283, 1358 (2017) (outlining the national security concerns
associated with the future effects of climate change). Congress is also concerned
with the impact of climate change at localities where U.S. Armed Forces operate,
and where strategic implications for future conflict exist. Id. (“[C]limate change is
a direct threat to the national security of the United States and is impacting stability
in areas of the world both where the United States Armed Forced are operating
today, and where strategic implications for future conflict exist”). Id.
24
See MATTHEW D. ADLER & ERIC A. POSNER, NEW FOUNDATIONS OF COSTBENEFIT ANALYSIS 25 (2006) (“[Cost-benefit analysis] is an imperfect but practicable
tool by which governmental decision-makers implement the criterion of overall
welfare—a criterion that differs from the Kaldor Hicks efficiency in important
ways.”). The current consensus is that efficiency is difficult to define. Therefore,
the modern foundation of cost-benefit analysis rests upon the maximization of
overall well-being, which is one of several criteria mentioned in law and economics
literature. For a discussion about Pareto efficiency, Kaldor-Hicks efficiency, and
cost-benefit-analysis, see id. at 21-23.
25
Richard Stewart, Economic Incentives for Environmental Protection:
Opportunities and Obstacles, in ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, THE ECONOMY AND SUSTAINABLE
DEVELOPMENT 171, 172 (Richard L. Revesz et al. eds., 2001).
26 Id.
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the “quintessential global-scale collective action problem,” 27
because it affects those who do not contribute to it, while the benefits
of carbon abatement are not restricted to those who pursue it. 28
Hence, the involved parties have incentives to free ride.29
Beyond its global scale, climate change is unique because it
refers primarily to future events,30 with “implications that require
policy coordination and multi-level governance” (national and
international levels, specifically). 31 Two factors contribute to this
complexity. First, human behavior discounts the value of long-term
challenges in favor of present gains. 32 Second, the majority of
countries in the developed world are democracies based on electoral
cycles that tend to reward short-term considerations.33 Therefore, it
is crucial to enact climate change regulation under international
treaties.34
The Paris Agreement, which is aligned with the modern
framework on climate governance, reconciles elements of bottom-

27
Daniel C. Esty & Anthony L. I. Moffa, Why Climate Change Collective Action
Has Failed and What Needs to be Done Within and Without the Trade Regime, 15 J. INT’L
ECON. L. 777, 777 (2012). Pollution is the paradigmatic example of the tragedy of
the commons, for which coercive laws and taxation are cited as potential solutions.
See Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCI. 1243, 1245-47 (1968)
(incentivizing individuals to reduce pollution requires “coercive laws or taxing
devices that make it cheaper for the polluter” to not to pollute than pollute).
Summarizing the tragedy of the commons, he states: “The rational man finds that
his share of the cost of the wastes he discharges into the commons is less than the
cost of purifying his wastes before releasing them. Since this is true for everyone,
we are locked into a system of ‘fouling our own nest,’ so long as we behave only as
independent, rational, free-enterprisers.” Id. at 1245.
28
See MICHAEL J. TREBILCOCK, DEALING WITH LOSERS: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY
OF POLICY TRANSITIONS 120 (2014) (“Because the benefits of carbon abatement cannot
be restricted to those who contributed to creating them, all parties have an incentive
to freeride.”).
29 Id.
30
ANTHONY GIDDENS, THE POLITICS OF CLIMATE CHANGE 2 (2ed. 2011).
31
Esty & Moffa, supra note 27, at 777.
32
See GIDDENS, supra note 30, at 2-3 (explaining future discounting, or the idea
that humans prefer a small reward in the present instead of a large reward in the
future). See also Peter C. Fishburn & Ariel Rubinstein, Time Preference, 23 INT’L ECON.
REV. 677, 677 (1982) (discussing how decisions are affected by time on the “relative
desirability of an outcome”).
33
See GIDDENS, supra note 30, at 7 (“In democratic countries, governments
come and go. Moreover, in real-life contexts many issues jostle for attention . . .”).
34
See Charles F. Sabel & David G. Victor, Governing Global Problems Under
Uncertainty: Making Bottom-Up Climate Policy Work, 144 CLIMATIC CHANGE 15, 18
(2017) (arguing that combatting climate change requires widespread collaboration).
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top measures, such as NDCs, 35 with the joint efforts of member
states to reduce carbon emissions (top-down mechanisms). 36
According to this Agreement, all countries are obligated to establish
a target and to report and evaluate their progress within two years
after signing, and every five years after. 37 While this Article
acknowledges the controversy concerning the legal status of the
Paris Agreement under U.S. law,38 it dismisses it because both the
Obama and Trump administrations considered it an agreement.39
Under international law, however, the Paris Agreement is a treaty,40
35
See Paris Agreement, supra note 6, art. 3-4, 6 (codifying the voluntary
commitments that parties to the Agreement are making to reduce GHG emissions).
36
These bottom-top measures require countries to establish NDCs with more
demanding targets than those set in the past. Each country voluntarily determines
its targets, considering their own national priorities, circumstances, and
capabilities. Jennifer Morgan et al., Elements and Ideas for the 2015 Paris Agreement 12
(World Resources Inst., Working Paper, 2015).
37
Paris Agreement, supra note 6, art. 4(2), 4(3), 4(9), 4(11).
38
U.S. domestic law on treaties is complex, because the terminology used in
international law and U.S. domestic law differs. Under international law, all
written international agreements governed by international law are referred to as
“treaties,” whereas in U.S. law, only some are labeled as such. According to U.S.
law, the President has the power to sign a treaty, but it does not go into effect until
it is ratified by two-thirds of the Senate. U.S. CONST. art. 2, § 2. Executive
agreements are international agreements concluded by the President under
independent constitutional authority in his capacity as commander-in-chief, but
these agreements are treaties for international law purposes. See BARRY E. CARTER
ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW 70 (7th ed. 2018).
39
For more information, see Daniel Bodansky, The Legal Character of the Paris
Agreement, 25 REV. EUR. COMMUNITY & INT’L ENVTL. L. 142 (2016) (examining the
ambiguity surrounding whether the Paris Agreement is a legally binding
agreement). The Department of State determined the Paris Agreement did not
address substantive legal obligations beyond those stated in its parent treaty, the
UNFCCC (supra note 17), and concluded there was no need to submit it to the
Senate. See U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, FOREIGN AFFAIRS MANUAL 711 FAM 723 (2001)
(requiring that international agreements receive consent from two-thirds of the
Senate).
40
Under international law, the Paris Agreement is unequivocally a treaty. See
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 2(1)(a), May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S.
332. The United States signed the Paris Agreement on April 22, 2016, and the treaty
entered into force on November 4, 2016. See Paris Agreement, supra note 6, art. 21.
See, e.g., Bodansky, supra note 39, at 142. But cf. Radoslav S. Dimitrov, The Paris
Agreement on Climate Change: Behind Closed Doors, 16 GLOBAL ENVTL. POL. 1, 3 (2016)
(detailing the efforts of the Obama administration in negotiating the Paris
Agreement as an executive agreement). For purposes of the cost-benefit analysis
developed in this Article, the controversy is not determinative because the United
States is legally bound to its provisions under international law, regardless of
domestic determinations. The Paris Agreement also determines a three-year
minimum period after its entry into force for parties to withdraw. See Paris
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and the United States is legally bound until the withdrawal becomes
effective. 41 Importantly, cost-benefit analysis theorists have long
defended respect for international law.42
From a theoretical perspective, this Article fills a void in the
international environmental law literature, because, to-date, few to
no studies on the cost-benefit analysis of the withdrawal have been
published. 43 The framework chosen for this research also
contributes to the literature on cost-benefit analysis, 44 because it
addresses a contemporary example of a public policy enacted
without the normative use of economics.45 This Article builds on the
use of cost-benefit analysis to improve the environment,46 aiming at
Agreement, supra note 6, art. 28. Importantly, “[i]nternational law makes clear that
U.S. presidents cannot simply delete prior signatures from treaties.” KOH, supra
note 9, at 40.
41
According to the framework established in the Paris Agreement, the U.S.
can withdraw after November 4, 2020. See Paris Agreement, supra note 6, art. 28.
42
See e.g., JACK L. GOLDSMITH & ERIC A. POSNER, THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW 185 (2005).
43
According to Westlaw and Google Scholar searches targeting cost-benefit
analysis of U.S. withdrawal, as of July 10, 2019, no studies had been published. The
only exception is an earlier note focusing on the moral dimension of cost-benefit
analysis and related international law principles and contrasting U.S. behavior with
India’s engagement. See Carolina Arlota, Cost & Benefit Analysis of the United States’
Withdrawal from the Paris Agreement, 1 GNLU J.L. & ECON. 45, 52 (2018).
44
This topic is timely because the Trump administration is accused of using
cost-benefit analysis methodology without scientific criteria. See Antonio M. Bento
et al., Flawed Analyses of U.S. Auto Fuel Economy Standards, 362 SCI. 1119, 1119-21
(2018) (emphasizing fundamental flaws and inconsistencies related to basic
economic theory and empirical studies in the proposed rule by the current
administration). For more information, see Rena Steinzor, Cost-Benefit Analysis
According to the Trump Administration, REG. REV. (July 23, 2019),
https://www.theregreview.org/2019/07/23/steinzor-cost-benefit-analysisaccording-trump-administration/ [https://perma.cc/NB2U-MWWX] (arguing
that the Trump administration has discredited cost-benefit analysis: “As practiced
by the Trump Administration, cost-benefit analysis has become a perversion of a
neutral approach to policymaking.”).
45
Cost-benefit analysis as a regulatory tool has different meanings, ranging
from the normative use of economics to using the criterion of wealth maximization
when evaluating a particular policy. See generally RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS OF LAW 402-03 (7th ed. 2007). This Article does not distinguish between
cost-benefit analysis and benefit-cost analysis. To understand this distinction, see
Richard O. Zerbe Jr., Is Cost-Benefit Analysis Legal? Three Rules, 17 J. POL’Y ANALYSIS
& MGMT. 419, 419-56 (1998) (differentiating benefit-cost analysis). But see Richard
O. Zerbe Jr., The Legal Foundation of Cost-Benefit Analysis, U. WASH. 1, 3 n.2 (2007)
(noting the terms are typically used interchangeably).
46
See, e.g., RICHARD L. REVESZ & MICHAEL A. LIVERMORE, RETAKING
RATIONALITY: HOW COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS CAN BETTER PROTECT THE ENVIRONMENT
AND OUR HEALTH (2008).
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the maximization of overall well-being. 47 This research is
particularly relevant due to the significant increase in U.S. carbon
dioxide emissions in 2018. 48 The limited improvement in global
energy efficiency in 2018, attributed to the static energy policy
environment that year, further advances an interest in the U.S.
withdrawal.49
This Article aims to make two significant contributions. First,
the goal of this Article is to evaluate the manner in which the U.S.
withdrawal from the Paris Agreement was decided.
This
procedural account of the cost-benefit analysis illustrates how the
Trump administration’s decision abruptly departs from reasoned
regulatory action. This Article highlights the actions of interest
groups, the absence of a scientific advisor, and the lack of sound
scientific studies. Because of this unreasoned action and the
corresponding legal uncertainty, litigation is likely to increase. 50
Given this likely increase, the Article reviews current U.S. litigation
related to the Paris Agreement. This Article is the first to review
current U.S. litigation specifically mentioning the withdrawal of the
Paris Agreement by name.51 The Article argues that the manner in
which the administration decided to withdraw contributes to
increased legal challenges and related transaction costs. As such, it
provides new arguments that might be used for future claims.
Second, this Article focuses on a cost-benefit analysis based on
substantive accounts, namely, the merits of the withdrawal itself. It
47
”Cost-benefit analysis is best defended as a welfarist decision procedure.
Cost-benefit analysis is justified as a decision procedure to the extent that it
advances overall well-being—that is, the well-being of the public generally, if not
necessarily every member of the public—relative to alternative decision
procedures, including the null case of doing nothing.” ADLER & POSNER, supra note
24, at 6. “Public” for purposes of this Article, is the U.S. general population.
48
INT’L ENERGY AGENCY, GLOBAL ENERGY & CO2 STATUS REPORT: EMISSIONS 7
(2019).
49 Id. at 3.
50
See ROBERT D. COOTER & THOMAS S. ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 400-04 (6th
ed. 2016) (discussing how legal uncertainty is likely to foster litigation and therefore
increase transaction costs).
51
A Google Scholar search having as criteria “Paris Agreement,” and
“litigation” in April 2020 shows that previous articles focus on the number of
lawsuits in the U.S. considering climate litigation, in general. This literature did not
control for actual reference to the treaty itself or addressed its withdrawal. See, e.g.,
Michael Burger & Justin Gundlach, The Status of Climate Change Litigation a Global
Review,
U.N.
ENV’T
10-14
(May
2017),
http://columbiaclimatelaw.com/files/2017/05/Burger-Gundlach-2017-05-UNEnvt-CC-Litigation.pdf [https://perma.cc/V8YK-FYES] (providing an overview of
climate change litigation).
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examines the challenges in quantifying the withdrawal and
confronts its domestic and international costs and reputed benefits.
This research demonstrates that the costs are much higher than the
arguable benefits, especially due to the disregard of the social cost
of carbon. In addition, this Article addresses the role of subnational
entities and finds that they are unable to compensate for such a
withdrawal. This Article also discusses the loss of a window of
opportunity regarding climate action, the potential consequences
should the United States be perceived as free riding, and why the
withdrawal from the Paris Agreement ultimately jeopardizes the
position of the United States as a global leader. Accordingly, this
Article contributes to future policy assessments.
This Article is organized as follows: Part I, the section you are
currently reading, provides an overview. Part II presents a costbenefit analysis of the withdrawal, focusing on its procedural terms,
i.e., the manner in which it was decided. Part III addresses the costs
and benefits of the withdrawal based on its substantive terms, i.e.,
targeting the merits, assessing the quantitative and qualitative
effects of the withdrawal for the country, and the related challenges.
Part III also considers the international impact of such a withdrawal,
particularly the costs to the United States. Part IV concludes that the
U.S. withdrawal from the Paris Agreement does not pass the
comprehensive cost-benefit analysis developed in this Article.
II. THE U.S. WITHDRAWAL FROM THE PARIS AGREEMENT IS NOT
JUSTIFIED BY COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS BASED ON ITS PROCEDURAL
ACCOUNT
This portion of the Article argues that, based on its procedural
account (the manner by which it was decided and implemented), the
U.S. withdrawal from the Paris Agreement does not satisfy the costbenefit analysis. This Article acknowledges that cost-benefit
analysis, as a technique, is not mandatory to all administration
policies because it carries its own costs.52 International treaties are
52
At the federal level, cost-benefit analysis is traditionally required for all
policies considered significant regulatory actions. See Exec. Order No. 12866, 58 Fed.
Reg. 51735, § 3 (Sept. 30, 1993) (defining a “significant regulatory action” as one
with an annual effect on the economy of $100 million or more). These rules are
subject to the White House Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA).
This provision is supplemented by Exec. Order No. 13771, 82 Fed. Reg. 9339, § 3
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traditionally dismissed due to the foreign affairs exemption. 53
Reasoned decision-making, however, is a requisite for any
administrative action under the Administrative Procedure Act
(APA).54 The impact of withdrawal on the U.S. economy is likely to
be above the general threshold that triggers cost-benefit analysis.55
A cost-benefit analysis was not required when the APA was
approved, and it is a relatively new practice.56
Procedure matters; in fact, the actual consideration of costs and
benefits57 is indicative of reasoned administrative action, i.e., that it
is justified and not based on arbitrariness. Extrapolating the
requirements of reasoned administrative action to processes
involving foreign affairs is a logical step. These matters generally
demand some level of confidentiality and often entail weighing
factors relating to national security, emergencies relating to
international crisis, flexibility, and the global impact of U.S. policy

(Jan. 30, 2017) (regarding reducing regulations and controlling regulatory costs).
This executive order determines that when an agency considers new regulation it
should repeal a minimum of two regulations aiming at offsetting the costs of the
proposed regulation.
53
See Exec. Order No. 13563, 76 Fed. Reg. 3821, § 4(a) (Jan. 18, 2011).
54
See Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706 (authorizing judicial
review and compelling the court to set aside actions found to be “arbitrary and
capricious, abuse of discretion or otherwise not in accordance with the law”).
55
The threshold is the annual effect of the policy on the economy, which is $100
million. See Exec. Order No. 12866, supra note 52. The EPA estimates that repealing
the Clean Power Plan, which implements the country’s NDCs under the Paris
Agreement, could save $33 billion in compliance costs through 2030. Fact Sheet for
the Proposal to Repeal the Clean Power Plan, ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY (2017),
https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2017-10/documents/fs-proposedrepeal-cpp-final_oct10.pdf [https://perma.cc/PC3V-Y6ZS]. Withdrawal from the
Paris Agreement easily meets this threshold. Section B discusses the deficiencies of
the EPA’s analysis of such repeal.
56
See Cass R. Sunstein, Cost-Benefit Analysis and Arbitrariness Review, 41 HARV.
ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 8-9 (2017) (“The APA was enacted in 1946, and cost-benefit analysis
became entrenched within the executive branch of the federal government only
since the 1980s and perhaps as late as 1993 or even 2011.”).
57
See Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2706-08 (2015) (finding that cost is a
required consideration for executive agencies). See Sunstein, supra 56, at 3
(discussing the rise of the cost-benefit state and the trend of judicial decisions
requiring cost considerations as indicative of non-arbitrariness).
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choices.58 Reasoned analysis fosters uniform criteria for policies.59
Deregulation, which involves removing regulations in place in a
particular market, needs to be reasoned.60 Such reasoning does not
need to be exhaustive but should inform the administrative action.
Where regulatory norms exist, the administration is required to
justify their revocation of the regulations. 61 Assuming that costbenefit analysis is a neutral check on administrative government
initiatives, deregulatory policies should be restricted by cost-benefit
analysis in the same manner as regulatory ones.62
Section A discusses the lack of formal consideration of the actual
costs and benefits of the withdrawal as indicative of unreasoned
administrative action. The absence of a scientific advisor, citations
to unsound science, repetitive behavior that undermines scientific
evidence on climate change that is likely attributable to lobbying and
political factors, and the lack of consideration of alternative policies
with less stringent consequences are all notable indicators. Section
B addresses the potential consequences of the lack of formal costbenefit analysis. Specifically, this section reviews the current U.S.
litigation on the Paris Agreement, and concludes the withdrawal
creates significant uncertainty for all actors, thus increasing the
transaction costs.

58
See ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY, 282-83 (1973)
(criticizing the expansion of presidential powers on traditional arguments of
secrecy and superior expertise of the executive and describing how this led to the
Vietnam War).
59
See REVESZ & LIVERMORE, supra note 46, at 13 (“Cost-benefit analysis can be
used to ensure that . . . decisions are based on reasoned analysis and not . . . on the
unaccountable whim of an official”).
60
Cf. Daniel Hemel et al., How Antonin Scalia’s Ghost Could Block Donald
Trump’s
Wall,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Jan.
25,
2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/25/opinion/how-antonin-scalias-ghostcould-block-donald-trumps-wall.html [https://perma.cc/E3X5-DY4E] (quoting
Justice Scalia explaining how “[n]o regulation is ‘appropriate’ if it does significantly
more harm than good”).
61 Id.
62
See Daniel A. Farber, Regulatory Review in Anti-Regulatory Times, 94 CHI.KENT L. REV. 383, 385 (2019) (“If advocates of CBA are right that CBA functions in
the administrative state as a neutral check on government initiatives, deregulatory
policies should be as much restricted by CBA as regulatory ones.”).
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A. Indications that the Administration Disregarded Costs and Benefits
A plethora of evidence indicates that the Trump administration
ignored the costs and benefits of withdrawing from the Paris
Agreement. At the time of the decision, the Trump administration
lacked a director of the Office of Science and Technology Policy,63
which suggests the administration could not have acted in a
reasoned manner when deciding to withdraw from the
Agreement.64 No U.S. president has ever taken so long to fill this
administrative post.65 Congress understands the need for a science
advisor to provide the president with “independent, expert
judgment and assistance on policy matters which require accurate
assessments of the complex scientific and technological features
involved.” 66 A scientific advisor would have assisted with the
technical data, ensuring formal consideration of the costs and
benefits of withdrawal.
Further evidence that the withdrawal neglected to weigh the
costs and benefits is the lack of sound scientific studies supporting
it.67 Sound scientific evidence, defined in this Article as one based
Commonly known as the science advisor.
See Neal F. Lane & Michael Riordan, Trump’s Disdain for Science, N.Y. TIMES
(Jan. 4, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/04/opinion/trump-disdainscience.html [https://perma.cc/Z9U2-DDN6] (“[T]he lack of good science advice
has not slowed the president and his administration in their assaults on health and
environmental policy and in weighing in on national-security issues involving
science and technology. His decision to pull the nation out of the Paris climate
agreement is one example.”).
65
See Mythili Sampathkumar, Donald Trump has Not had a Science Advisor for
Longer than Any Other President, INDEPENDENT (July 27, 2018),
https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/us-politics/whitehouse-science-advisor-donald-trump-us-climate-change-global-warminga8467076.html [https://perma.cc/LR5B-7PMK] (noting that, at the time, the
highest-ranked administrator associated with science was a thirty-one-year-old
with a bachelor’s degree in political science). The Senate confirmed the extremeweather expert Kelvin Droegemeier early this year. Tony Romm & Ben Guarino,
Senate Confirms Trump’s Science and Tech Advisor After Lengthy Vacancy, WASH. POST
(Jan.
3,
2019),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2019/01/03/senate-confirmstrumps-science-tech-adviser-after-lengthy-vacancy/
[https://perma.cc/7AM83Y6J].
66
42 U.S.C. § 6602 (2020).
67
Rachel Becker, Trump Used Misleading Job Stats to Justify Pulling Out of Paris
VERGE
(June
1,
2017),
Climate
Agreement,
https://www.theverge.com/2017/6/1/15727398/donald-trump-paris-climatechange-agreement-us-pulls-out-million-jobs [https://perma.cc/A22V-B34E].
63
64
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on the best evidence and science available,68 is particularly relevant
to climate change matters because it avoids bias. Sound science also
fosters a common ground approach in the international arena,
incentivizing countries to cooperate to combat climate change.
Climate change itself is complex, but scientific knowledge outlining
broad principles on the topic is unimpeachable. 69 Domestically,
withdrawing from the Paris Agreement contradicts the findings of
the panel of U.S. experts representing federal agencies.70
This was not the first time the Trump administration
contradicted itself. 71 It consistently engages in practices that are
scientifically questionable at the very least; 72 this includes the
elimination of the projected effects of increased carbon dioxide
pollution after 2040 in their estimations.73
Cost-benefit analysis enables reasoned decision-making because
it clarifies government choices by making them more transparent;
this analysis aims to isolate government decisions from the effects of

68
PATRICIA PARK, INTERNATIONAL LAW FOR ENERGY AND THE ENVIRONMENT 11
(2d ed. 2013).
69
See Antony Millner et al., Ambiguity and Climate Policy 3 (Nat’l Bureau of
Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 16050, 2010) (explaining that broad scientific
principles include laws of thermodynamics and “[carbon dioxide] traps outgoing
long-wave radiation, causing warming”). The authors also emphasize that detailed
empirical predictions based on sophisticated models used to translate such
principles into predictions may lead to different forecasts. Id.
70
U.S. GLOBAL CHANGE RESEARCH PROGRAM, supra note 22, at 35-72.
71
The current administration continues to undermine science and climate
change regulation. Since 2017, the current administration has attempted to relax or
remove most of the environmental regulations implemented during the Obama
administration. The withdrawal from the Paris Agreement is one of many of such
deregulatory initiatives such as the Clean Water Rule, the Clean Power Plan, and
the clean car standards.
72
The Obama administration engaged in reasoned decision making when
signing the Paris Agreement. See Obama, supra note 3. Meanwhile, the Trump
administration has been accused of stopping the congressional testimony of a State
Department senior official regarding climate science. See Lisa Friedman, White
House Tried to Stop Climate Science Testimony, Documents Show, N.Y. TIMES (June 8,
2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/08/climate/rod-schoonovertestimony.html [https://perma.cc/TH8G-U4QU].
73
The administration likely chose to do so because the effects of global
warming will be particularly severe after 2050. Coral Davenport & Mark Landler,
Trump Administration Hardens Its Attack on Climate Science, N.Y. TIMES (May 27,
2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/27/us/politics/trump-climatescience.html [https://perma.cc/TEP5-P3D9].
The authors quote Michael
Oppenheimer, a professor of geosciences and international affairs at Princeton, who
criticized the administration, saying “[n]obody in the world does climate science
like that. It would be like designing cars without seatbelts or airbags.” Id.
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interest groups attempting to advance their agendas. 74 This is
particularly important in the case of climate change, because the
main contributors of carbon emissions deny its existence75 and lobby
to dismiss effective regulation. 76 In addition, Donald Trump’s
presidential campaign was financed by substantial contributions
from oil tycoons. 77 The President’s views on climate change are
reportedly influenced by friends and donors in the oil industry.78
This is concerning because relevant experts in the Trump
administration were against the withdrawal.79 Others would have
preferred the administration to remain a party to the Agreement,
although they would have liked to see a reduction in U.S. NDCs.80
Given that the reasons for withdrawing from the Paris Agreement
remain unclear, the transparency that accompanies cost-benefit
analysis is particularly necessary.

See POSNER, supra note 45, at 402-03.
Major polluters in the U.S. are borrowing the tactics perfected by the
tobacco industry. This 1998 quote from the American Petroleum Institute illustrates
their efforts to discredit scientific knowledge: “Victory will be achieved when . . .
average citizens ‘understand’ (recognize) uncertainties in climate science;
recognition of uncertainties becomes part of the ‘conventional wisdom’ . . . Those
promoting the Kyoto treaty on the basis of extant science appear to be out of touch
with reality.” See CIEL, SMOKE AND FUMES: THE LEGAL AND EVIDENTIARY BASIS FOR
HOLDING BIG OIL ACCOUNTABLE FOR THE CLIMATE CRISIS 3 (Nov. 2017),
https://www.ciel.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/Smoke-Fumes-FINAL.pdf
[https://perma.cc/G7D5-UCXY] (emphasizing the recurring misleading actions of
the oil industry across a variety of public and environmental issues).
76 Id. at 18-20 (noting the actions of then-CEO of ExxonMobil, Rex Tillerson,
who later became Secretary of State). See also Jane Mayer, In the Withdrawal from the
Paris Climate Agreement, the Koch Brothers’ Campaign Becomes Overt, NEW YORKER
(June
5,
2017),
https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/in-thewithdrawal-from-the-paris-climate-agreement-the-koch-brothers-campaignbecomes-overt [https://perma.cc/9QNW-BJWE] (discussing President Donald
Trump’s association with the Koch brothers).
77
See Mayer, supra note 76 (connecting President Donald Trump, VicePresident Mike Pence, and the then-head of the EPA Scott Pruitt to the Koch
brothers).
78
See Davenport & Landler, supra note 73 (discussing the influence of donors
like investor Carl Icahn and the oil-and-gas billionaire Harold Hamm—both of
whom “pushed Mr. Trump to deregulate the energy industry”).
79
KOH, supra note 9, at 53.
80
See Thomas A. Utzinger, Trump Administration Climate Policy and the Paris
Agreement: Mitigating Factors Will Continue Emissions Reductions, 20 A.B.A. AIR
QUALITY COMMITTEE NEWSL. 3, 4 (2017). See also Paris Agreement, supra note 6 art.
4(11) (recommending each party increase its NDCs). The treaty does not mandate
any specific emissions reductions, but its procedural obligations, such as the
transparency framework, are legally binding. See Banda, supra note 4, at 331.
74
75
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As much as one is agnostic, the presidential statement raises
concerns that he was actually catering to his political base at the
expense of the United States’ best interests. 81 Democrats and
Republicans are divided on environmental issues. 82 The former
tend to support related policies, whereas the latter often disregard
and/or deny climate change.83 This distinct divide between the two
parties is unique to U.S. politics. 84 When addressing the
withdrawal, the president presented questionable numbers 85 and
used his campaign slogan, suggesting that political motivations
rather than reasoned decision-making were at play.86 This indicates
81
The longest shutdown in United States history, which jeopardized the U.S.
economy and inflicted significant damages on thousands of public employees,
demonstrates that President Trump will pander to his base at the expense of U.S.
residents. See Jim Tankersley, Shutdown’s Economic Damage Starts to Pile Up,
Threatening
an
End
to
Growth,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Jan.
15,
2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/15/us/politics/government-shutdowneconomy.html [https://perma.cc/6BMA-A3AH].
82
This divide has not always been the case. Then-Vice-President George H.
W. Bush campaigned as the “environmental” president. Once elected, he
introduced the cap-and-trade program that controlled acid rain pollution. See
Richard Conniff, The Political History of Cap and Trade, SMITHSONIAN MAG. (Aug.
2009), https://www. smithsonianmag.com/science-nature/the-political-historyof-cap-and-trade-34711212/ [https://perma.cc/7SKM-6JCE]. President Reagan,
despite his stance against interventionism, promoted and signed the Montreal
Protocol on the Conservation of the Ozone Layer based on cost-benefit analysis. See
CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE COST-BENEFIT REVOLUTION 15 (2018).
83
See Matto Mildenberger et al., The Spatial Distribution of Republican and
Democratic Climate Opinions at State and Local Scales, 145 CLIMATIC CHANGE 539 (2017)
(emphasizing how the division is not only along party lines but also along state lines).
It is noteworthy that climate change is now tied to health care on Democratic
primary voters’ deciding factors. See Maggie Astor & Lisa Friedman, Beto O’Rourke
Releases $5 Trillion Climate Change Proposal, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 29, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/29/us/politics/beto-orourke-climatechange.html [https://perma.cc/6YYX-HJL7].
84
In Europe, conservative parties also recognize the need for climate action,
so the success of Green Parties in the 2019 European Parliament elections is striking.
See Amy Davidson Sorkin, Europe’s Fragmented Center, NEW YORKER (June 2, 2019),
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2019/06/10/europes-fragmentedcenter [https://perma.cc/Y6X9-D9BQ].
85
See Jon Greenberg, Fact-Checking Donald Trump’s Statement Withdrawing from
the
Paris
Climate
Agreement,
POLITIFACT
(June
1,
2017),
https://www.politifact.com/article/2017/jun/01/fact-checking-donald-trumpsstatement-withdrawing-/ [https://perma.cc/PN7Z-CQTS] (stating that President
Trump relied on a study by NERA Economic Consulting that “makes assumptions
that gave several economics and environmental professors pause”).
86
See Trump, supra note 1 (“The Paris Agreement handicaps the United States
economy in order to win praise from the very foreign capitalists and global activists
that have long sought to gain wealth at our country’s expense. They don’t put
America first. I do, and I always will.”).
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a decision process based on populist governance as opposed to a
rational determination of what is in the best interest of the American
people.87
Another indicator that the Trump administration neglected costbenefit analysis as a method to help maximize overall well-being88
is the omission of alternative policies.89 The president preemptively
stated the Paris Agreement was exclusively in the interest of foreign
countries, without considering the benefits to the U.S. of remaining
party to the treaty. 90 Under international law, the definition of
“treaty” includes mutual benefits,91 but the Trump administration
did not acknowledge so. This is concerning because it departs from
previous U.S. policy. In the case of the Paris Agreement, President
Obama clearly understood that regulating,92 (meaning, in this case,
committing to voluntary standards aiming at curbing carbon
emissions) has a net benefit.93 Moreover, the more extreme weather
events that scientists attribute to climate change, the higher the
87
President Trump caused controversy when he stated, “I was elected to
represent the citizens of Pittsburgh, not Paris.” See Greenberg, supra note 85.
President Trump referred to a city that has coal and oil—as opposed to considering
the national interest of the United States. Id.
88
See WEIMER & VINING, supra note 13, at 399-434 (concerning the tenets of
cost-benefit analysis).
89
Trump, supra note 1.
90
See Trump, supra note 1 (”As President, I can put no other consideration
before the wellbeing of American citizens. The Paris Climate Accord is simply the
latest example of Washington entering into an agreement that disadvantages the
United States to the exclusive benefit of other countries, leaving American
workers—who I love—and taxpayers to absorb the cost in terms of lost jobs, lower
wages, shuttered factories, and vastly diminished economic production.”
(emphasis added)).
91
Vienna Convention, supra note 40, arts. 2, 26, 27. See PARK, supra note 68, at
3 (discussing how the ultimate goal of treaties is the protection of human dignity).
For an overview of the literature discussing the normative dimension of
international law, see Allen Buchanan & David Golove, Philosophy of International
Law, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF JURISPRUDENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF THE LAW 838
(Jules Coleman et al. eds., 2004).
92
See Exec. Order No. 13563, supra note 52, at § 6 (showing that President
Obama embraced cost-benefit analysis and issued executive orders requesting
regulatory impact analyses (RIAs), including the requirement that agencies must
consider their previous estimations in RIAs and assess these in light of the actual
consequences of a particular action).
93
See Barack Obama, The Irreversible Momentum of Clean Energy, SCI. 126-29
(Jan.
13,
2017),
https://science.sciencemag.org/content/sci/355/
6321/126.full.pdf [https://perma.cc/27TX-23WS] (arguing the Paris Agreement is
not a partisan issue, as it fosters the U.S.’s low emissions economy and renewable
energy industry, thereby maintaining U.S.’s economic competitiveness while
enhancing the country’s climate security).
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pressure for governmental regulation94—not deregulation. Hence,
scrutiny concerning the withdrawal (as a deregulatory policy)
increases.
Non-modification of the status quo was not considered, as the
Trump administration never weighed the benefits of remaining in
the Paris Agreement or the dangerous consequences of the
withdrawal.95 Neither was a reduction in U.S. NDCs considered as
an alternative. 96 The administration made no determination of
whose costs and benefits count, compiled no catalogue of predicted
effects and future alterations, performed no calculation of present
values of net benefits, and offered no related recommendations97—
not even regarding the potential costs of increased pollution after
the withdrawal. 98 It is worth mentioning that had the U.S. not
complied with the stipulated targets, no international sanctions
would have been imposed—the country would not have been
penalized.99
B. Consequences of Disregarding Procedural Cost-Benefit Analysis
By neglecting to consider alternative policies that would result
in less dire consequences both domestically and internationally, and
instead withdrawing from the Paris Agreement completely, the
Trump administration caused significant legal uncertainty in both
spheres.
After Trail Smelter in 1941, countries are obligated to refrain from
causing transboundary harm. 100 This prohibition, as well as the
94
See Michael B. Gerrard, United States Climate Change Law, in THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL CLIMATE CHANGE LAW 631 (Cinnamon P. Carlarne et
al. eds., 2016).
95
The Obama administration engaged in reasoned decision-making when
joining the Paris Agreement, because the President justified the net benefits of
joining the Agreement, including job creation in renewable energy. See Obama,
supra note 3.
96
Paris Agreement, supra note 6, art. 4(11) (recommending that each party to
the agreement increase its NDCs).
97
WEIMER & VINING, supra note 13, at 404. For details on cost-benefit analysis,
see also OFF. OF MGMT. & BUDGET, CIRCULAR A-4 ON REGULATORY ANALYSIS (2003).
98
Trump, supra note 1.
99
Nuccitelli, supra note 7.
100
The Trail Smelter Arbitration (1941) involved a Canadian smelter that
produced fumes that caused damages to Washington State. The tribunal ruled that
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duty to compensate (the “polluter pays” principle), 101 means that
state responsibility is a double-edged sword, and the international
regime both assumes harm will occur and encourages preventing
that harm.102 More recently, the 1972 Stockholm Declaration and the
1992 Rio Declaration also obligate countries not to cause
transboundary harm, although the obligation is not absolute. 103
However, countries are required to undertake due diligence104 and,
perhaps most importantly, the obligation has become part of
customary international law.105 Moreover, in the domestic sphere, if
the EPA has reason to believe that any air pollutants emitted in the
United States “cause or contribute to air pollution which may
reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare in a
foreign country,” the agency must act.106 These two factors strongly
suggest the U.S. withdrawal is not justified under a cost-benefit
analysis based on the procedural account, because withdrawal may
subject the country to international scrutiny and potential liability
for climate harm, while increasing uncertainty about applicable
laws.
Analysis of such uncertainty is relevant because the current
administration’s deregulation efforts have been met with an
the activity of the smelter needed to be reduced and regulated in accordance with
the regime determined in the award. Trail Smelter Arbitration (U.S. v. Canada),
Arbitral
Trib.,
3
U.N. REP. INT’L ARB. AWARDS
1905
(1941)
http://legal.un.org/riaa/cases/vol_III/1905-1982.pdf [https://perma.cc/UZZ2C7R8]. In addition to the duty to prevent transboundary harm, Trail Smelter
determined that, under the “polluter pays” principle, the polluting state must
compensate for the transboundary harm it caused. See Rebecca M. Bratspies &
Russel A. Miller, Transboundary Harm in International Law, in TRANSBOUNDARY HARM
IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: LESSONS FROM THE TRAIL SMELTER ARBITRATION 3 (Rebecca M.
Bratspies & Russel A. Miller eds., 2006).
101
Trail Smelter Arbitration, supra note 100. See also Bratspies & Miller, supra
note 100, at 4 (emphasizing the modern declaration of state responsibility for
transboundary harm, while criticizing the narrowness of the decision, because the
defendant was held liable only if the resulting harm was of “serious economic
consequence”).
102
Bratspies & Miller, supra note 100, at 9.
103
Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Env’t, princ.
22, U.N. Doc. A/Conf.48/14/Rev.1 (1972); Rep. of the United Nations Conference
on Env’t and Dev., Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, princ. 2,
U.N. Doc. A/Conf.151/5/Rev.1 (1992).
104
Jesse L. Reynolds, International Law, in CLIMATE ENGINEERING AND THE LAW
116 (Michael B. Gerrard & Tracy Hester eds., 2018).
105
Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996
I.C.J. Rep. 226 (July 8), https://www.icj-cij.org/files/case-related/95/09519960708-ADV-01-00-EN.pdf [https://perma.cc/8VCW-B2KQ].
106
42 U.S.C. § 7415 (2020).

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol41/iss4/1

2020]

United States' Withdrawal from the Paris Agreement

903

unprecedented low success rate in domestic courts.107 Research on
deregulation efforts related to the environment and public health
shows the Trump administration has suffered significant and
recurrent losses in court since the inauguration. 108 The Trump
administration intends to repeal the Clean Power Plan, 109 which is
crucial to achieve the U.S. NDCs.110 The EPA claims the repeal will
save $33 billion in avoided compliance costs through 2030.111 As this
calculation is disputed, litigation ensued.112 Other recent changes
relating to cost-benefit analysis in general are also dubious.113 Such
changes are particularly concerning because the Clean Power Plan

107
See Anna M. Phillips, In California vs. Trump, the State is Winning Nearly All
TIMES
(May
7,
2019),
its
Environmental
Cases,
L.A.
https://www.latimes.com/politics/la-na-pol-california-trump-environmentallawsuits-20190507-story.html [https://perma.cc/TN4N-Z2CV] (“Legal experts
said they couldn’t recall agencies under any recent president having such a low
success rate in court.”).
108
See Roundup: Trump-Era Agency Policy in the Courts, INST. FOR POL’Y
INTEGRITY (last visited Apr. 24, 2020), https://policyintegrity.org/deregulationroundup [https://perma.cc/QXP5-ZU2T] (tracking the outcome of litigation
involving the Trump administration’s deregulation efforts).
109
Electric Utility Generating Units: Repealing the Clean Power Plan: Proposal,
ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY (2017), https://www.epa.gov/stationary-sources-airpollution/electric-utility-generating-units-repealing-clean-power-plan-0
[https://perma.cc/F7EF-AE33].
110
See Anna McGinn, Understanding the Paris Agreement, SCHOLARS STRATEGY
NETWORK (Apr. 12, 2019), https://scholars.org/contribution/understanding-parisagreement [https://perma.cc/V6KA-8V8G] (explaining that the NDCs
contributions of the U.S. were based almost entirely on the Clean Power Plan).
111 Fact Sheet for the Proposal to Repeal the Clean Power Plan, supra note 55.
112
See Stuart Shapiro, A Recipe for Improving Regulatory Analysis, REG. REV.
(Feb. 28, 2018), https://www.theregreview.org/2018/02/28/shapiro-improvingregulatory-analysis/ [https://perma.cc/8W94-CYJX] (explaining that, under the
Trump administration, regulatory agencies have been criticized for their use of
“shoddy analysis” and for concealing the regulatory process from the public).
113
The EPA’s fact sheet acknowledges other changes that differ from the
Obama administration: No longer are domestic costs compared to domestic
benefits, nor is energy efficiency viewed as a benefit but rather as an avoided cost
showing “the true magnitude of the Clean Power Plant’s costs.” See Fact Sheet for
the Proposal to Repeal the Clean Power Plan, supra note 55. See also Valuing Climate
Damages: Updating Estimation of the Social Cost of Carbon Dioxide, NAT’L ACADS. SCI.,
ENGINEERING, & MED. 51 (2017) (disputing the administration’s focus on domestic
contributions instead of considering the global impact of emissions and climate
change); SUNSTEIN, supra note 82, at 159 (contending the change from global to
domestic emissions is unjustified as “the height of arbitrariness”).
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is an example of how stable regulation fosters voluntary climate
action.114
In such context, litigation over Trump administration policies on
climate change has increased, 115 also following international
strategies. Globally, when seeking redress from damages arising
from climate change, plaintiffs focused on private parties, such as
corporations. 116 Recently, the lawsuits expanded to include
governments,117 with citizens and non-governmental organizations
basing their claims on international treaties. 118 Therefore, it is
114
See Lily Hsueh, Credible and Stable Regulation Encourages Voluntary Climate
Action,
REG.
REV.
(Sept.
19,
2018),
https://www.theregreview.org/2018/09/19/hsueh-credible-stable-regulationvoluntary-climate-action/ [https://perma.cc/2BLV-9M2L] (arguing that under the
Clean Power Plan, companies increased transparency regarding their carbon
emissions).
115
For a comprehensive study on environmental litigation during the first
year of the Trump presidency, see Dena P. Adler, U.S. Climate Change Litigation in
the Age of Trump: Year One, COLUM. L. SCH.: SABIN CTR. FOR CLIMATE CHANGE L.
(2018),
http://columbiaclimatelaw.com/files/2018/02/Adler-2018-02-U.S.Climate-Change-Litigation-in-the-Age-of-Trump-Year-One.pdf
[https://perma.cc/A4AP-YKJA]. See also Dena P. Adler, U.S. Climate Change
Litigation in the Age of Trump: Year Two, COLUM. L. SCH.: SABIN CTR. FOR CLIMATE
CHANGE L. 16-21 (2019), http://columbiaclimatelaw.com/files/2019/06/Adler2019-06-US-Climate-Change-Litigation-in-Age-of-Trump-Year-2-Report.pdf
[https://perma.cc/R4SQ-4XG6] (emphasizing how certain climate litigation
actually supports the administration’s deregulatory policies, despite the
government not having won a case).
116
Geetanjali Ganguly et al., If at First You Don’t Succeed: Suing Corporations for
Climate Change, 38 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 841, 846 (2018).
117
Environmentalists are pursuing a strategy known as litigate-to-mitigate,
believing judges are “less likely than politicians to be influenced by oil, coal, and
gas companies”. See Jonathan Watts, ‘We Should Be on the Offensive’—James Hansen
Calls for Wave of Climate Lawsuits, GUARDIAN (Nov. 17, 2017),
https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2017/nov/17/we-should-be-onthe-offensive-james-hansen-calls-for-wave-of-climate-lawsuits
[https://perma.cc/GS9Y-2CSM].
In the United States, twenty-one
environmentalists who are too young to vote, calling themselves guardians of
future generations, filed suit seeking declaratory and injunctive relief against the
U.S. president and several executive agencies. The plaintiffs claim, inter alia, that
GHG emissions from carbon dioxide—produced by burning fossil fuels—
jeopardize the environment, violating their due process and that the defendants
“violated their obligation to hold certain natural resources in trust for the people
and for future generations.” See Juliana v. United States, 217 F.Supp.3d 1224, 1233
(D. Or. 2016).
118
The case often referenced is Urgenda Found. v. Kingdom of Netherlands (2015),
in which the plaintiffs argued the Dutch government’s then-recently enacted
reduction of GHG emissions was insufficient to achieve the country’s contribution
to the Paris Agreement goals. See Burger & Gundlach, supra note 51, at 15
(providing a discussion of the case).
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unsurprising that plaintiffs have initiated litigation specifically
related to the Paris Agreement. 119 A Hawaiian Supreme Court
decision mentions the Paris Agreement in the context of advancing
environmental protections. 120 Another decision invokes the
Agreement to dismiss claims that a single polluter could not affect
GHG emissions.121 Other courts are less sympathetic.122 The only
case that refers to the U.S. withdrawal from the Agreement does so
incidentally and dismisses a removal based on a federal question.123
However, as an updated communication concerning the U.S.
intent to withdraw was issued in November 2019, related litigation
involving presidential limits to unilaterally withdraw may follow.124
Although the U.S. president has significant authority regarding
foreign affairs (and related political-question doctrine),125 he must
comply with legal requirements. 126 Commentators argue that
President Trump’s decision to withdraw from NAFTA should be
barred due to congressional authority to regulate commerce under
119
The Westlaw database was used to search “Paris Agreement” in federal
and state courts. With false positives removed, as of July 10, 2019, only four cases
actually referred to the Agreement.
120
In re. Haw. Elec. Light Co., 445 P.3d 673, 695 n.21 (Haw. 2019).
121
See Cleveland Nat’l Forest Found. v. San Diego Ass’n of Gov’ts, 397 P.3d
989, 1000 (Cal. 2018) (”The fact that a regional plan’s contribution to reducing
greenhouse gas emissions is likely to be small on a statewide level is not necessarily
a basis for concluding that its impact will be insignificant in the context of a
statewide goal.”).
122 See Western Org. of Res. v. U.S. Bureau of Land Mgmt., CV 16-21-GF-BMM,
2018 WL 1456624, at *14 (D. Mont. Mar. 23, 2018) (dismissing the plaintiffs’ claims
that the social cost of the carbon and global carbon budget—both based on the Paris
Agreement—should be used in a NEPA cost-benefit analysis, the court held that
the plaintiffs had no case).
123
Mayor of Baltimore v. BP P.L.C., 388 F.Supp.3d 538, 550, 559 (D. Md. 2019).
124
KOH, supra note 9, at 50 (explaining that this might be a possibility because
the withdrawal can only be effective after three years of entry into force of the Paris
Agreement). The text of the Agreement only determines when the actual
withdrawal can take effect but does not explicitly require the communication to be
within a year before the intended withdrawal. Paris Agreement, supra note 6, art.
28. As previously stated, the U.S. confirmed its intent to withdrawal in Nov. 4,
2019. See Friedman, supra note 8.
125
See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES
140-43 (6th ed. 2006) (noting the difficulty in determining which foreign policy
issues are justifiable and which actually present political questions).
126
See Zivotofsky v. Clinton, 566 U.S. 189 (2012) (redrawing the legal
boundaries of presidential powers involving the denunciation of treaties). Chief
Justice John Roberts asserted that the political question doctrine did not bar judicial
review. Id. at 201. See also KOH, supra note 9, at 173-74 (discussing the omission in
Zivotofsky of the famous political question test introduced in Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S.
186 (1962)).
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the Commerce Clause.127 Using the same rationale, scholars argue
withdrawing from a climate change agreement, which has a
significant impact on domestic and foreign commerce, would also
be prohibited.128
Finally, the uncertainty caused by the unreasoned withdrawal
from the Paris Agreement 129 is also likely to increase domestic
litigation, at the very least. After all, the more uncertain a particular
rule or its interpretation is, the higher the likelihood that the parties
will refrain from negotiating, 130 and instead pursue litigation.
Accordingly, the transaction costs for all domestic and foreign actors
involved in environmental, energy, and related areas will likely
increase.131
III. THE U.S. WITHDRAWAL IS NOT JUSTIFIED BY COST-BENEFIT
ANALYSIS BASED ON ITS SUBSTANTIVE TERMS
This Part assesses the costs and benefits of the U.S. withdrawal
from the Paris Agreement, focusing on its merits rather than how
the decision was reached and implemented (see Part II for
information on the procedure). Part III addresses whether the
withdrawal produces more benefits than costs both qualitatively
(analyzing the descriptive data) and quantitatively (examining the
numerical data). Section A discusses the challenges of such an
assessment. Section B explores the domestic costs of the withdrawal,
followed by its arguable benefits in Section C. Section D analyzes
the impact of the U.S. decision at the global level. It is worth
reiterating that the baseline for this research is the withdrawal from
the Paris Agreement itself, so the benefits that accrued during the
KOH, supra note 9, at 50-51.
Id.
129
Because the withdrawal was not justified at the time, additional questions
about it keep occurring, contributing to more uncertainty. In July 2019, the head of
the EPA wrongfully argued that § 115 of the Clean Air Act would make the Paris
targets domestically binding. See Jean Chemnick, Wheeler: Obscure Air Provision
Behind Paris Withdrawal, CLIMATE WIRE (July 15, 2019).
130
All things being equal, investors will look for the reduced risk opportunity.
This is based on the economic assumptions that human beings are reluctant to
change (status quo bias) and generally risk-averse. For more information, see
Daniel Kahneman et al., Anomalies: The Endowment Effect, Loss Aversion, and Status
Quo Bias, 5 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 193, 197-203 (1991).
131
Legal uncertainty often leads to litigation, which increases transaction
costs. COOTER & ULEN, supra note 50, at 400-04.
127
128
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Agreement that will be terminated once the withdrawal is
implemented are included. In this vein, a methodological note is
required. A cost-benefit analysis performed by a U.S. agency may
be limited to the consideration of the interests of the country’s
citizens.132 Nonetheless, cost-benefit analyses of policies on topics
related to foreign affairs have previously considered the interests of
those outside the United States.133 This Part considers these interests
because climate change encompasses collective rights beyond
national borders.134
A. The Challenges of Measuring the Costs and Benefits of the
Withdrawal
Quantifying the U.S. withdrawal from the Paris Agreement is
not a trivial task, due to the complexity of climate change and its
impact. 135 Estimations include market damages (infrastructure,
tourism, and increased energy demand), and non-market damages
(ecological impact and culture values, often measured in terms of
“willingness to pay”). 136 Predictions are perennially affected by
uncertainty, speculation, and lack of information regarding future
emission of GHGs, the effects of past and future emission on the
climate system, the impact of changes in climate on the physical and
biological environment, and the translation of such environmental

OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, CIRCULAR A-4, supra note 97.
See, e.g., Lynn A. Karoly & Francisco Perez-Arce, A Cost-Benefit Framework
for Analyzing the Economic and Fiscal Impacts of State-Level Immigration Policies, RAND
CORP. (2016); Carolina Arlota, Is the Rescission of Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals
(DACA) Justified by the Results of Cost-Benefit Analysis?, 29 BERKELEY LA RAZA L. J. 93
(2018).
134
See DOUGLAS A. KYSAR, REGULATING FROM NOWHERE: ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
AND THE SEARCH FOR OBJECTIVITY 123-200 (2010) (arguing that environmental policy
should include the interests of existing members of the political community as well
as those of people overseas, future generations, and even other species).
135
There is no consensus as to when climate change-related costs will incur or
the monetary amount of those costs. ERIC POSNER & ALAN O. SYKES, ECONOMIC
FOUNDATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 230 (2013).
136
INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, Climate Change 2014:
Mitigation
of
Climate
Change,
212
(2014),
https://www.ipcc.ch/site/assets/uploads/2018/02/ipcc_wg3_ar5_chapter3.pdf
[https://perma.cc/DP6X-9HCH].
132
133
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effects into economic damages. 137 The current literature consists
primarily of studies focusing on the consequences of the U.S.
withdrawal on climate governance. 138 Studies addressing the
quantitative impact of the U.S. withdrawal are scarce and based on
incomplete modeling assumptions. A recent study finding potential
economic gain for carbon-intense energy sectors, for example,
neglects to address environmental costs.139
Estimating the impact of the withdrawal involves additional
challenges. The effects of recently enacted policies by U.S. cities,140
states, 141 and international actors (parties to the Paris Agreement,
U.N. organs, and non-governmental organizations [NGOs]) 142 are
137
Interagency Working Grp. on Soc. Cost of Greenhouse Gases, United States
Government, Technical Support Document: - Technical Update on the Social Cost of
Carbon for Regulatory Impact Analysis - Under Executive Order 12866, ENVTL.
PROTECTION
AGENCY
3
(2016),
https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/201612/documents/sc_co2_tsd_august_2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/3CDH-7S5H].
138 See, e.g., Zhang Hai-Bin et al., U.S. Withdrawal from the Paris Agreement:
Reasons, Impacts, and China’s Response, 8 ADVANCES IN CLIMATE CHANGE RES. 220, 222
(2017); Miranda Schreurs, The European Union and the Paris Climate Agreement:
Moving Forward Without the United States, 15 CHINESE J. POPULATION RESOURCES &
ENV’T 192, 192 (2017).
139
Duy Nong & Mahinda Siriwardana, Effects on the U.S. Economy of its
Proposed Withdrawal from the Paris Agreement: A Quantitative Assessment, 159 ENERGY
621, 623 (2018).
140
New York City intends to rid itself of $5 billion of investments it has made
in fossil fuel companies and reduce its carbon emissions. Oliver Milman, New York
Plans to Divest $5bn from Fossil Fuels and Sue Oil Companies, GUARDIAN (Jan. 10, 2018),
https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2018/jan/10/new-york-city-plans-todivest-5bn-from-fossil-fuels-and-sue-oil-companies
[https://perma.cc/Q69P66V7].
141
Several states, led by California and New York, are setting their own limits
for GHG emissions. Thirty-four U.S. states are committed to reducing global
warming despite President Trump’s decision. See Chelsea Harvey, These are the
States Fighting to Save the Earth, MOTHER JONES (Apr. 10, 2017),
https://www.motherjones.com/environment/2017/04/trumps-domestic-warclimate-action-has-propelled-states-battle/" [https://perma.cc/EM8Y-K6UW]. In
addition, the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, a cap-and-trade system of
cooperation to reduce carbon dioxide emissions from the power sector, includes
nine states (Connecticut, Delaware, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, New
Hampshire, New York, Rhode Island, and Vermont). See Program Overview and
Design,
THE
REGIONAL
GREENHOUSE
INITIATIVE
(2018),
https://www.rggi.org/program-overview-and-design/elements
[https://perma.cc/5AEA-4TTD].
142
In April 2019, the Canadian federal government extended its carbonpricing program by imposing a tax on fossil fuels in the four provinces that had
declined to enact their own climate action plans. See Brad Plumer & Nadja
Popovich, These Countries Have Prices on Carbon. Are They Working?, N.Y. TIMES (Apr.
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unclear. Meanwhile, President Trump directed agencies to review
(modify, suspend, or rescind) regulations that may “unduly
burden” energy development—including those aimed at reducing
GHG emissions.143
Another relevant challenge in quantifying “before” and “after”
withdrawal scenarios is how to measure potential adaptation to
climate change. Specific data is not available. Adaptation is not the
best approach to curb emissions,144 and climate change is a dynamic
event scientists are still trying to understand. 145 The volatile
approach the Trump administration is taking in many areas
increases the complexity of the assessment. If the trade war with
China continues, for instance, emissions may be reduced, whereas if
the President succeeds in expanding the U.S. economy by 5% or 6%,
emissions will likely increase.146 The U.S. withdrawal from the Paris
Agreement, in and of itself, opened the country to carbon-tariff
conflicts, as China and the European Union may impose retaliatory
tariffs on all goods imported from the United States.147

2, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/04/02/climate/pricingcarbon-emissions.html [https://perma.cc/X4AL-X34N]. See also State and Trends of
Carbon Pricing Report, WORLD BANK GROUP (May 2018) (listing the forty countries
with carbon prices).
143
Exec. Order No.13783, 82 Fed. Reg. 16093 (Mar. 31, 2017).
144
BENJAMIN K. SOVACOOL ET AL., FACT AND FICTION IN GLOBAL ENERGY POLICY
187 (2016).
145 Id. at 184-85.
146
Kate Larsen et al., Taking Stock 2017: Trump’s Regulatory Rollback Begin,
RHODIUM GROUP (Mar. 27, 2017), https://rhg.com/research/trumps-regulatoryrollback-begins/ [https://perma.cc/2EKR-L2HV].
147
Christoph Böhringer & Thomas F. Rutherford, U.S. Withdrawal from the
Paris Agreement: Economic Implications of Carbon-Tariff Conflicts, HARV. PROJECT ON
CLIMATE AGREEMENTS (Aug. 2017); Edward Taylor, German Carmakers Fear Losing
Competitive Edge After U.S. Paris Exit, REUTERS (June 2, 2017),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-climatechange-germancarmakers/german-carmakers-fear-losing-competitive-edge-after-u-s-paris-exitidUSKBN18T1Q0 [https://perma.cc/TRH8-WC8J] (following the announcement
of the U.S. withdrawal, German interest groups expressed concerns about the
competitiveness of their automobiles in relation to those produced in the United
States).
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B. The Domestic Costs of the U.S. Withdrawal from the Paris
Agreement
As discussed in Part II, the Trump administration disregarded
the benefits of remaining in the Paris Agreement and the costs of
rescinding it. The United States will bear the costs of implementing
the withdrawal, which have not been publicized yet. No estimations
of the effects of the withdrawal were considered.148 Astonishingly,
not even environmental costs were accounted for.149
The presidential announcement was also silent on the social cost
of carbon,150 the present value of which is measured as the damages
incurred by the presence of an additional ton of carbon dioxide in
the atmosphere. 151 The social cost of carbon is of paramount
importance in climate policy,152 although estimating it is notoriously
difficult.153 Predictions for this cost are even more complex when
focusing solely on the domestic level, due to the limited empirical
literature addressing regions or a single country. 154 The EPA
previously estimated the social cost of carbon as $42 for 2020—

Nuccitelli, supra note 7.
See Trump, supra note 1 (summarizing his claims, the President stated:
“This agreement is less about the climate and more about other countries gaining a
financial advantage over the United States. The rest of the world applauded when
we signed the Paris Agreement—they went wild; they were so happy—for the
simple reason that it put our country, the United States of America, which we all
love, at a very, very big economic disadvantage.”).
150 Id.
151
William D. Nordhaus, Revisiting the Social Cost of Carbon, 10 PROC. NAT’L
ACAD. SCI. U.S. 1518, 1518 (2017).
152
See Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Nat’l Highway Traffic Safety Admin.,
538 F.3d 1172, 1203 (9th Cir. 2008) (determining that agency regulations must
consider the social cost of carbon). See also Daniel A. Farber, Coping with Uncertainty:
Cost-Benefit Analysis, the Precautionary Principle, and Climate Change, 90 WASH. L. REV.
1659, 1708-09 (2015) (elaborating on the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Center for
Biological Diversity v. National Highway Traffic Safety Administration).
153
Interagency Working Grp. on Soc. Cost of Greenhouse Gases, supra note
137, at 1 (describing how monetized damages associated with an incremental
increase in carbon emissions per year are intended to include—but are not limited
to—human health, net agricultural productivity, property damages from increased
flood risk, and the value of ecosystem services due to climate change).
154 Id. at 11.
148
149
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assuming a 3% discount rate, 155 which is disputable. 156 Experts
contend the social cost of carbon is typically underestimated in
climate policies.157 The National Academy of Sciences argues that
global warming is subject to global emissions, so damages should be
considered globally. 158 The Trump administration disagrees,
although it did not provide a reason,159 and its proposed new rule
estimates the social cost of carbon from $1 to $6.160
In light of these omissions and controversies, it is vital to analyze
costs in specific defining terms, which includes cost as a relational
concept, i.e., focusing on defining the interests involved before
calling it a cost or a benefit.161 This application of the notion of cost
as a relational concept 162 requires a nuanced understanding that
155 See ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY SOCIAL COST OF CARBON FACT SHEET (Dec. 2016),
https://19january2017snapshot.epa.gov/climatechange/social-cost-carbon_.html
[https://perma.cc/3LR8-6G9P] (showing values as of 2016).
156 Id. (acknowledging one of the most difficult challenges regarding the social
cost of carbon estimations is the calculation of discount rates). See also Lisa
Heinzerling, Regulatory Costs of Mythic Proportions, 107 YALE L.J., 1981, 2051 (1998)
(criticizing discounting assumptions, specifically the use of income-influence
economic methods of valuing life, and concluding that assuming an increase future
income implies that future lives are more worth than current ones); Douglas A.
Kysar, Climate Change, Cultural Transformation, and Comprehensive Rationality, 31 B.C.
ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 555, 579 (2004).
157
See Richard L. Revesz et al., Global Warming: Improve Economic Models of
Climate Change, 508 NATURE 173, 174-75 (2014) (discussing discounting rates and the
fact that models tend to omit damages to labor productivity and growth
productivity, among other factors).
158
NAT’L ACADS. SCI., ENGINEERING & MED., supra note 113, at 50-51.
159
The Trump administration’s departure from the previous use of the global
figure for the social cost of carbon in favor of the domestic figure is a decision that
“may or may not be justifiable. But it was not justified. No explanation was given.
That is the high of arbitrariness, and it should be invalidated in court.” SUNSTEIN,
supra note 82, at 159.
160
Jason Bordoff, Trump vs. Obama on the Social Cost of Carbon—and Why It
Matters,
WALL
STREET
J.
(Nov.
15,
2017),
https://blogs.wsj.com/experts/2017/11/15/trump-vs-obama-on-the-social-costof-carbon-and-why-it-matters/ [https://perma.cc/H3DL-M53D].
During the
Trump administration, scientists subjected the EPA’s proposed new regulation on
the Clean Power Plan to significant criticism because it disregarded, for instance,
the impact of global emissions. By considering only domestic emissions, it
ultimately increased costs while reducing the benefits of regulatory action, which
contributed to lowering the social cost of carbon significantly. Id. See also criticisms
by the NAT’L ACADS. SCI., ENGINEERING & MED., supra note 113.
161
WARREN J. SAMUELS ET AL., THE ECONOMY AS A PROCESS OF VALUATION 21631 (1997).
162
See Daniele Bertolini & Carolina Arlota, Why Michigan v. EPA Requires that
the Meaning of the Cost/Rationality Nexus Be Clarified, 29 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 125,
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benefits to some are costs to others.163 Even if costs are considered
in relational terms, it would not validate the U.S. withdrawal from
the Paris Agreement, as this Section demonstrates. After all, whose
interests count? Whose interests does the withdrawal benefit? As
the time of this writing, it remains unclear whose interests the
administration officially took into account.164
The withdrawal from the Paris Agreement and the resulting
increase of carbon emissions affects a myriad of interests. Because
an increase in GHGs is among the leading cause of climate change,
rain, snow, tornados, flooding, droughts, tsunamis, famine, and
natural disasters will occur more frequently across the globe after
the U.S. withdrawal.165 The cleaning and removal of debris carries
significant costs and requires input from all levels of government
and assistance from the entire community. 166 Climate change
negatively affects health, causing illnesses that incapacitate and
even kill. 167 This decreases productivity, devastates family unity,
and related social networks. 168 Natural disasters will increase
demand for hospital care and emergency services. Healthcare
companies and insurers will raise their prices accordingly. The
changes will jeopardize wildlife, water sources, and the overall
global ecosystem.169
The specific consequences of the U.S. withdrawal from the Paris
Agreement on the country’s population will be severe. Travel will
be disrupted due to destruction of infrastructure. Energy services
and electronic communication may be interrupted more

155 (2017) (arguing that the Supreme Court neglected to consider cost as a relational
concept).
163
See SAMUELS ET AL., supra note 161, at 216-34.
164
See Trump, supra note 1 (noting that while the presidential statement
mentions loss of jobs, it refers to a study that did not consider job creation in the
green economy).
165
For a legal discussion about the causes of climate change and their
connection with such disasters, see CHRIS WOLD ET AL., CLIMATE CHANGE AND THE
LAW 5-31 (Matthew Bender & Co. Inc. ed., 2009).
166
ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 15, at 1.
167
See INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, GLOBAL WARMING OF
1.5°C,
11-12
(2018),
https://report.ipcc.ch/sr15/pdf/sr15_spm_final.pdf
[https://perma.cc/3Y3D-NQD9] (explaining the increase in number of deaths as
well as the costs of malnutrition, respiratory conditions, infectious vector-borne
diseases and other public health costs).
168 Id. at 9-11 (discussing global predictions on the increase in temperature that
the Paris Agreement aims to avoid).
169 Id. at 11-12.
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frequently. 170 Family and friends will not see each other and
business may falter or go under completely. Banks may lose their
investments in new clean-energy technology that would have been
needed under the Paris Agreement. Tourism activities will be
adversely impacted. Residents may be forced to migrate within the
United States. Refugees whose lands are no longer fertile and/or
cannot live in their own countries due to desertification or
significant change in the weather will consider immigrating to the
United States.171 This, at a minimum, will increase the U.S. budget,
compromising economic resources. Even as this occurs, money will
need to be spent to rebuild infrastructure as opposed to investing in
improvements. Finally, because of the withdrawal, the U.S. military
may face more challenges abroad.172
Rising sea levels are perhaps the most indicative evidence
available of global warming.173 A more significant change in water
levels in addition to increased water pollution174 is likely to occur
after the U.S. withdrawal.175 In the United States, 91% of electricity
is produced by thermoelectric (nuclear and fossil-fueled) power
plants, which rely on the availability of water resources and depend

170
JOEL B. EISEN ET AL., ENERGY, ECONOMICS AND THE ENVIRONMENT 730-31
(Foundation Press 5th ed. 2015).
171
Statistics on the predicted refugee population vary significantly. A
renowned study estimates that by 2050, there will be approximately 150 million
refugees who have left their homes due to the consequences of global warming. See
Norman Myers, Environmental Refugees in a Globally Warmed World, 43 BIOSCIENCE
752, 753 (1993).
172
This argument is based generally on the congressional assessment. See
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018, supra note 23, at 1358.
173
Even with the Paris Agreement in place, the current scenario is alarming.
A recent study shows that the rate of ice loss in Greenland in 2012 was of 400 billion
tons per year, almost four times the rate in 2013. See John Schwartz, Greenland’s
Melting Ice Nears a “Tipping Point,” Scientists Say, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 21, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/21/climate/greenland-ice.html
[https://perma.cc/DL46-HFSA].
174
Water pollution is among the most severe consequences of climate change.
See P.C.D. Milly et al., Stationary is Dead: Whither Water Management, 319 SCI. 573,
573 (2008) (emphasizing that researchers have had to change their assumptions,
such as their belief that natural systems fluctuate within an unchanging envelope
of variability, due to climate change).
175
See THE IMPACT OF CLIMATE CHANGE ON THE UNITED STATES ECONOMY
(Robert Mendelsohn & James E. Neuman eds., 2004) (providing an early (and
detailed) attempt to quantify the economic impact of climate change in the United
States). The work cites multiple studies estimating the cost of damages caused by
climate change as 1.5% to 2% of the U.S. GDP. Id. at 2.
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on them to be a certain temperature. 176 As such, an increase in
temperature will affect the cooling of water necessary in the
production of electricity. Electricity production will suffer should
the availability of water significantly change or decrease. 177
Meanwhile, heating and air conditioning will be used more often,
increasing energy consumption and GHG emissions.
Research shows that an increase in the average summer
temperature negatively affects all industries, not only those most
assume will suffer such as fishing, tourism, and agriculture. 178
Industries such as retail, wholesale, services, finances, and
construction, which jointly represent more than a third of the U.S.
gross domestic product (GDP), will suffer, whereas very few sectors
such as utilities (1.8% of GDP) would benefit from an increase in
temperature.179
Recent research shows that the extreme heat waves of the
summer of 2018 are not an isolated incident. 180 Predictions
considering the long-term effect of higher temperatures estimate
GDP will decrease by as much as 10% from 2070 to 2099, with
reductions being more significant in the higher emission scenario
considered by the World Bank.181
Documented weather events leading to extreme heat and
droughts have been recorded in U.S. states since 1880. 182 Texas,
Oklahoma, New Mexico, and Louisiana lost three million acres due
to wildfires, suffering $6 to $8 billion in losses due to recordbreaking summer heat in 2011.183 Early in 2019, California electricity
176
Michelle T. H. van Vliet et al., Vulnerability of U.S. and European Electricity
Supply to Climate Change, 1546 NATURE CLIMATE CHANGE 676, 676 (2012).
177 Id.
178
Ric Colacito et al., Climate Change and the Cost of Inaction, VOX CEPR POL’Y
PORTAL (Oct. 28, 2016), https://voxeu.org/article/climate-change-and-costinaction [https://perma.cc/SX8B-UEZ2].
179 Id.
180
See M. M. Vogel et al., Concurrent 2018 Hot Extremes Across Northern
Hemisphere due to Human-Induced Climate Change, EARTH’S FUTURE 692, 702 (2019)
(finding the planet is entering a “new climate regime,” with “extraordinary” heat
waves intensified by global warming).
181 See Colacito et al., supra note 178 (noting that the impact per year on GDP
is not significant in the short term).
182 Turn Down the Heat: Why a 4°C Warmer World Must Be Avoided, WORLD BANK
[WB]
18
(2012),
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/865571468149107611/pdf/NonAs
ciiFileName0.pdf [https://perma.cc/9P75-BVA6].
The World Bank calls
mitigation action the best insurance against uncertain future. Id. at 2.
183 Id. at 18.
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provider Pacific Gas and Electric declared bankruptcy due to
billions of dollars in liability costs accrued during two years of
wildfires.184 In the first half of the same year, floods and tornadoes
in the Midwest caused over $12.5 billion in damages. 185 It is
noteworthy that the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
estimates, with high confidence, that extreme events may be more
devastating economically than the impact of climate change
overall. 186 Nevertheless, residences and private businesses, and
schools, universities, and other public institutions, will incur greater
costs as people adapt their surroundings to become more resilient to
the effects of climate change, from rising temperatures to natural
catastrophes.
Certain segments of the population will feel the effects of climate
change and extreme weather much more than others. This
regressive nature of carbon-pricing means consumers bear the costs,
and those with lower incomes who spend a greater percentage of
their income on non-discretionary goods and services will suffer
more.187 If it is true that climate change does not affect people in
isolation, it certainly affects the less well-off disproportionally, in a
vicious cycle. 188 In addition, native and indigenous peoples will
experience more difficulties due to their lifestyles, which rely more
on nature.189 Remaining in the Agreement is therefore justified on a
distributional basis under prioritarianism, the understanding that

184
See Coral Davenport, Climate Change Poses Major Risks to Financial Markets,
Regulator
Warns,
N.Y.
TIMES
(June
11,
2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/11/climate/climate-financial-marketrisk.html [https://perma.cc/M2PA-TJQT] (noting that some experts believe that
bankruptcy “could be an early indicator of a wider economic toll” due to climate
change, as it makes wildfires “more frequent and destructive”).
185
Erin Ailworth, After Months of Floods and Tornadoes, Midwest Officials Tally
Billions
in
Damage,
WALL
STREET
J.
(July
4,
2019),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/after-months-of-floods-and-tornadoes-midwestofficials-tally-billions-in-damage-11562232602 [https://perma.cc/JVB5-TE76].
186
INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, supra note 136, at 212.
187
TREBILCOCK, supra note 28, at 121.
188
See Mark Nuttall, Environmental Institutions and Governance, WILEY ONLINE
LIBRARY 1, 3 (2018) (contending that climate change does not affect people in
isolation, but may impact indigenous people more severely).
189
INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, supra note 167, at 11
(emphasizing, with high confidence, that indigenous peoples, coastal and island
populations, and developing world inhabitants would be more exposed to the
consequences of climate change).
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regulations should maximize the well-being of all, with priority
given to those who are worse off.190
The economic impact of climate change on the U.S. economy
worries market experts. Recently, a top financial regulator who sits
on the Commodity Futures Trading Commission—a powerful
agency that oversees major financial markets including grain
futures, oil trading, and complex derivatives—posited that financial
risks from climate change are comparable to those posed by the
mortgage meltdown that triggered the 2008 financial crisis.191 As
climate change causes volatile weather events to occur more
frequently, larger providers of financial products—mortgages,
pensions, insurance, real estate—will not be able to shift risk away
from their portfolios. 192 More significant, perhaps, is that U.S.
companies, which make up the vast majority of the top 400
companies in the Carbon Disclosure Project (CDP) report,
underreport the risks of climate change, pegging it at $110 billion
(10% of the global risks reported to CDP).193
President Trump cited economic motivations such as protecting
the U.S. economy, particularly U.S. jobs. 194 A few commentators
eagerly agreed that withdrawal would be good for the U.S. economy
while having little effect on climate change.195 This, of course, does
not align with the best scientific data—economics included. 196
Effective policy-making is based on the assessment of complete

190
Mathew D. Adler, Future Generations: A Prioritarian View, 77 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 1478, 1478-79 (2009).
191
Davenport, supra note 184.
192 Id.; see also The Cost of Inaction: Recognising the Value at Risk from Climate
Change, ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT (2015) (finding that approximately 30% of
the world’s total stock of manageable assets may be at risk due to climate change,
and stressing that costs associated with climate change are a significant blind
spot for companies and their investors).
193
See Global Climate Change Analysis 2018, CDP 6 (2018),
https://www.cdp.net/en/research/global-reports/global-climate-change-report2018 [https://perma.cc/S389-XCDP] (recommending investors and policymakers
focus on demanding improved climate-related risk assessments from companies
headquartered in the United States).
194
Trump, supra note 1.
195 See Paris Climate Discord: U.S. Emissions Targets Could Trap Trump if He Stays
in the Accord, WALL STREET J. (May 31, 2017), https://www.wsj.com/articles/parisclimate-discord-1496272448 [https://perma.cc/M3EM-MHZ8] (“The reality is that
withdrawing [from the Paris Agreement] is in America’s economic interest and
won’t matter much to the climate.”).
196
For details, see Part II, Section B and Part III, Section C.
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policy impacts, including ancillary costs and ancillary benefits.197 In
U.S. policymaking, “the heuristic bias in favour of avoiding certain
losses may lead to an under-weighing of catastrophic scenarios of
climate change, at least in the context of U.S. policy-making.” 198
Moreover, the Trump administration has a reputation for focusing
on costs while neglecting benefits.199 Even when the administration
actually engages in cost-benefit analysis, research finds it to be
significantly flawed.200
In contrast, President Obama clearly believed the Paris
Agreement benefitted the United States, as it would create “more
jobs and economic growth driven by low-carbon investment.” 201
This is in line with European Union policy regarding climate
change.202 Many European countries have combined their desire to
protect the environment with their interest in technology. They
understand that to remain competitive, they need to be at the
forefront of science and renewable energy.203
This is one reason why significant economical actors such as
Shell, Apple, Walmart, Exxon Mobil, and General Electric support

197
See Jonathan B. Wiener, Precaution and Climate Change, in THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL CLIMATE CHANGE LAW 171 (Cinnamon P. Carlarne et
al. eds., 2016) (emphasizing the need for cost-effectiveness in the application of the
precautionary principle). For an in-depth discussion about ancillary harms and
benefits, see REVESZ & LIVERMORE, supra note 46, at 151-70.
198
David Dana, The Contextual Rationality of the Precautionary Principle, 35
QUEEN’S L.J., 67, 69 (2009).
199
SUNSTEIN, supra note 82, at 159.
200
Farber, supra note 62, at 431. Farber also states, “President Trump has
placed agenda controls on agencies that focus primarily on eliminating regulatory
costs rather than maximizing regulatory benefits. The Administration has also
begun initiatives to limit the evidence that can be considered in EPA cost-benefit
analysis and to eliminate an important class of regulatory benefits from
consideration.” Id.
201
Obama, supra note 3.
202
The European Union is famous for its environmental policies and its “winwin” negotiation strategy, which emphasizes the economic benefits of
environmental protection. See Dimitrov, supra note 40, at 9.
203
Schreurs, supra note 138. In addition to leaving the Paris Agreement,
President Trump authorized oil drilling in Alaska, a decision ruled unlawful in
League of Conservation Voters v. Donald J. Trump. See League of Conservation Voters
v. Trump, 303 F. Supp.3d 985 (D. Alaska 2018). Meanwhile, Norway ceased
offshore drilling in the Lofoten Islands, located in the Arctic Ocean. See Mikael
Holter, Norway is Walking Away from Billions of Barrels of Oil, BLOOMBERG (Apr. 7,
2019),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-04-08/norway-iswalking-away-from-billions-of-barrels-of-oil-and-gas [https://perma.cc/5G5A6M7S].
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the Paris Agreement. 204 Because it aims at curbing the effects of
global warming, it reduces uncertainty for such key players. Any
uncertainty makes business decisions more complex, increasing the
transaction costs for the parties. 205 In an open letter to President
Trump, more than thirty U.S. CEOs urged him to remain in the Paris
Agreement.206 Modernization, competitiveness, and predictability
are among the core justifications mentioned. 207 U.S. withdrawal
from the Agreement will likely increase the costs of doing business
in the country, while removing economic opportunities that would
have been generated if the administration took climate change
seriously. 208 It may also signal that U.S. companies have lost
government support and regulatory certainty.209
C. The Domestic Benefits of the Withdrawal
This Section delves into the supposed benefits of the U.S.
withdrawal from the Paris Agreement, focusing on presidential
The President believes the agreement
justifications. 210
“disadvantages the United States to the exclusive benefit of other
countries” and contends U.S. taxpayers would have to absorb the
costs of lower wages, lost jobs, closed factories, and a diminished
economy.211 However, the data cited by President Trump212 is from
204
Paul Wiseman, Analysts: Leaving Climate Deal Likely Wouldn’t Add U.S. Jobs,
PRESS
NEWS
(June
1,
2017),
ASSOCIATED
https://apnews.com/f89a55b6fcd0428eab02a6f41b24776b/Analysts:-Leavingclimate-deal-likely-wouldn't-add-US-jobs [https://perma.cc/U8BW-BAY3].
205
COOTER & ULEN, supra note 50, at 400-04.
206
CEOs of Major U.S. Companies Urge Trump: Stay in Paris, B TEAM (May 10,
2017), https://bteam.org/our-thinking/news/30-major-ceos-call-on-trump-stayin-paris [https://perma.cc/X8KR-TBS5].
207 Id.
208
U.S. GLOBAL CHANGE RESEARCH PROGRAM, supra note 22, at 1311-34
(arguing that the use of scientific information enabling people to prepare for climate
change in advance can provide economic opportunities while proactively
managing the risks, diminishing the negative effects and costs of climate change
over time).
209
Kemp, supra note 4, at 459.
210
Trump, supra note 1. The President says the United States “[w]ill withdraw
from the Paris Climate Accord but begin negotiations to reenter either the Paris
Accord or a really entirely new transaction on terms that are fair to the United
States, its business, its workers, its people, its tax payers.”
211 Id.
212
Id.

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol41/iss4/1

2020]

United States' Withdrawal from the Paris Agreement

919

a discredited study.213 Yet as of February 2020, the administration’s
position has not changed, and their arguments continue to revolve
around economic reasons.214
Economists quickly refuted President Trump’s arguments. They
contend rescinding the Paris Agreement will aggravate domestic
problems because it would not lead to job creation.215 Yet despite
the upcoming Paris withdrawal and the support of the Trump
administration, coal-fired power plants are closing across the
country.216 Jobs that might be preserved by the President’s decision,
such as those in the coal and oil industries, will not be created in the
renewable energy sector.217 Experts argue that the Paris Agreement
does not cost net jobs, because jobs in clean energy industries attract
more investment, creating a virtuous circle. 218 Fostering a green
213
President Trump invoked a study by NERA Economic Consulting. One of
the primary flaws of the study is that only the costs of compliance with the Paris
Agreement were factored in; benefits were disregarded. See Greenberg, supra note
85.
The Trump administration appears to make a habit of spreading
misinformation. When justifying their regulatory agenda, the administration cited
a study estimating that excessive regulatory action would cost the U.S. economy $2
trillion a year. The article, however, was based on a flawed methodology and was
never published by external sources—let alone peer-reviewed. See Richard W.
Parker, Hyping the Cost of Regulation, REG. REV. (June 25, 2019),
https://www.theregreview.org/2018/06/25/parker-hyping-the-cost-ofregulation/ [https://perma.cc/F2MQ-GJ7J].
214
In December 2018, during the Conference of Parties, an annual meeting of
the parties of the UNFCCC, the U.S. stated its energy-related CO2 emissions had
fallen by 14% since 2005, even as the U.S. economy grew by 19.4%. Outcome of the
24th Session of the Conference of the Parties (COP24) to the U.N. Framework Convention
DEP’T
ST.
(Dec.
15,
2018),
on
Climate
Change,
U.S.
https://://www.state.gov/outcome-of-the-24th-session-of-the-conference-of-theparties-cop24-to-the-un-framework-convention-on-climate-change-unfccc/https
[https://perma.cc/2YXS-KKEJ].
215
Wiseman, supra note 204. For information on the general impact of
environmental regulation, and evidence that environmental regulation does not
reduce or increase overall jobs in the United States, see Cary Coglianese &
Christopher Carrigan, The Jobs and Regulation Debate, in DOES REGULATION KILL JOBS?
1, 1-5 (Cary Coglianese et al. eds., 2014).
216
INT’L ENERGY AGENCY, GLOBAL ENERGY & CO2 STATUS REPORT: COAL 5
(2019).
217
Rolf Färe et al., Environmental Regulatory Rigidity and Employment in the
Electric Power Sector, in DOES REGULATION KILL JOBS? 89, 89-108 (Cary Coglianese et
al. eds., 2014).
218
As the EU and countries such as China and South Korea enact climate
change policies, they foster investment in advanced energy, materials, electronics,
including related technologies.
Over time, such advancements become
commercially competitive, ultimately resulting in trade advantages for those
countries. See JANE A. LEGGETT & RICHARD K. LATINIZE, CONG. RES. SERV., IF10668,
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economy and providing training and funding that allow workers to
transition to new jobs is seen as a viable alternative.219
Clean energy enabled the Obama administration to lower
greenhouse gas emissions to 1994 levels while creating 11.3 million
jobs. 220 Meanwhile, the Trump administration cut 70% of
investments in clean energy, 221 impeding job creation and
jeopardizing U.S. competitiveness in the sector. 222 A frequent
argument for U.S. reliance on coal is its cheap price, as the
infrastructure is already in place. There is no need to create wind
farms, establish extra grids, offer additional training, or require
further education. 223 However, constructing such infrastructure
would create jobs. Moreover, continuing to use coal produces
significant externalities such as global warming,224 and increases the
social cost of carbon, as it is the highest emitter of carbon dioxide.225
Should the U.S. persist in choosing coal, the country will only hasten
the day they will need to cope with the consequences of climate
change.
National leadership is needed to achieve a higher impact.
Scholars and politicians argue that increased state and local action
could help the United States achieve its NDCs. 226 In the U.S.,
POTENTIAL IMPLICATIONS OF U.S. WITHDRAWAL FROM THE PARIS AGREEMENT ON
CLIMATE CHANGE (Apr. 5, 2019).
219
This argument builds on the social resilience analysis discussed by Sidney
Shapiro and Robert Verchick. See Sidney A. Shapiro & Robert R.M. Verchick,
Inequality, Social Resilience, and the Green Economy, 86 UMKC L. REV. 963, 984 (2018).
220
Gina McCarthy, If Trump Dumps the Paris Accord, China Will Rule the Energy
Future, FOREIGN POL’Y (May 31, 2017), https://foreignpolicy.com/2017/05/31/itstime-for-the-united-states-to-lean-in-to-climate-change/
[https://perma.cc/8WHF-B4PA].
221
Varun Sivaram & Sagatom Saha, Power Outrage: Cutting U.S. Government
Funding for Energy Innovation Would Be a Grave Mistake, FOREIGN AFF. (May 17, 2017),
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2017-05-17/poweroutage [https://perma.cc/4Y6Z-T3JP].
222
This is in sharp contrast with China, which invests significantly in
renewables and is leading the race for innovation. See Peter Haas, Parxit, the United
States, and the World, 15 CHINESE J. POPULATION, RESOURCES, & ENV’T 186, 188 (2017).
223
See EISEN ET AL., supra note 170, at 729-30 (presenting similar arguments in
the context of renewable resources).
224 Id.
225
See infra Table 1 in Appendix I (showing the amount of carbon dioxide
produced per type of fuel).
226
Cooper, supra note 5, at 441; see AMERICA’S PLEDGE,
https://www.americaspledgeonclimate.com/about/ [https://perma.cc/CCM527QB]. See also Bloomberg Philanthropies, Hundreds of Mayors, Governors, CEOs and
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meaningful climate change action has been occurring at the state and
local levels for some decades.227 This should continue after the U.S.
withdrawal, as states, cities, and businesses join forces to meet the
goals of the Paris Agreement. 228 These arrangements, however,
cannot substitute for federal action.229 While on the one hand, the
America’s Pledge arrangement comprises more than half of the U.S.
economy—if it were a separate country, it would boast the thirdlargest economy in the world 230 —on the other hand, it only
encompasses 35% of total U.S. GHG emissions.231
Local and state legal actions have their own limitations and
require significant legal expertise to be effective. The 2005 green
building code enacted in Albuquerque, New Mexico was deemed to
override federal law. 232 Other similar ordinances were approved
but required fine legal crafting to substantively differentiate the
local scheme from national standards.233 Additional challenges arise
based on the dormant commerce clause 234 or the argument that

Others Pledge U.S. Commitment to Paris Climate Agreement, NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC (June
6, 2017), https://blog.nationalgeographic.org/2017/06/06/hundreds-of-mayorsgovernors-ceos-and-others-pledge-u-s-commitment-to-paris-climate-agreement/
[https://perma.cc/VK2N-JBZT] (referencing Michael Bloomberg’s declaration to
the U.N. Secretary General and the U.N. Framework Convention on Climate
Change). America’s Pledge is an initiative to fight climate change which includes
citizens, universities, businesses, cities, and states.
227
See Reuven S. Avi-Yonah & David M. Uhlmann, Combating Global Climate
Change: Why a Carbon Tax is a Better Response to Global Warming than Cap and Trade,
28 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 3, 20 (2009) (“[T]he most significant efforts in the United States
to address climate change have occurred at the state and local level.”).
228 See, e.g., Bloomberg Philanthropies, supra note 226.
229 See America’s Pledge: Phase 1 Report: States, Cities and Business in the United
States are Stepping up on Climate Action, AMERICA’S PLEDGE 9, 9-10 (Nov. 2017),
https://www.bbhub.io/dotorg/sites/28/2017/11/AmericasPledgePhaseOneRep
ortWeb.pdf [https://perma.cc/AV6L-ZZV7] (acknowledging that subnational
units cannot replace national policy on climate change).
230 Id. at 9.
231
Amy Harder, Reality Checking Carbon Reduction Efforts, AXIOS (Nov. 15,
2017),
https://www.axios.com/reality-checking-carbon-reduction-efforts1513306919-1bf3422c-a904-4640-ba87-8cc95dadefdf.html [https://perma.cc/3KRLBAU7].
232
See Cary Coglianese & Shana Starobin, The Legal Risks of Regulating Climate
Change
at
the
Subnational
Level,
REG. REV.
(Sept.
18,
2019),
https://www.theregreview.org/2017/09/18/coglianese-starobin-legal-risksclimate-change-subnational/ [https://perma.cc/CEY4-CXL6] (discussing the
challenges that arise from regulating climate change at the state and local level).
233 Id.
234 Id.
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climate policy falls under foreign affairs.235 Moreover, subnational
entities should consider that carbon-intensive industry would
simply transfer to less stringent jurisdictions nearby—so-called
“leakage.”236 Such efforts may even lead to greater harm,237 such as
the hardships that would occur if these jurisdictions have less
developed safety nets for their own population.
The reality is that the withdrawal “will neither bring back jobs
nor help the taxpayers, but it will most certainly hurt the United
States and the world.”238 A global problem such as climate change
is best addressed through action at the highest governance level
(national and global) because implementing a myriad of local
policies is costly, complicated, and ultimately inefficient as they are
limited to their geographical location.239 Subnational units are not
well suited for regulatory action on national conduct leading to
global externalities.240
Having established the absence of benefits in the medium and
long term in withdrawing from the Paris Agreement, a note on the
precautionary principle is needed. This principle enunciates that
action is required to avoid potential environmental threats in the
absence of scientific certainty.241 This Article, thus, reconciles costbenefit analysis and the precautionary principle. It assumes the
precautionary principle is determinative in relation to which risks
should be regulated, but not the stringency of regulation itself.242

235
Jean Galbraith, Cooperative and Uncooperative Foreign Affairs Federalism, 130
HARV. L. REV. 2131, 2148-51 (2017) (reviewing MICHAEL J. GLENNON & ROBERT D.
SLOANE, FOREIGN AFFAIRS FEDERALISM: THE MYTH OF NATIONAL EXCLUSIVITY (2016)).
236
Coglianese & Starobin, supra note 232.
237
Jonathan B. Wiener, Think Globally, Act Globally: The Limits of Local Climate
Policies, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 1961, 1964 (2007).
238
Robert N. Stavins, Why Trump Pulled the U.S. out of the Paris Accord and What
the
Consequences
Will
Be,
FOREIGN
AFF.
(June
5,
2017),
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2017-06-05/why-trump-pulled-us-outparis-accord [https://perma.cc/4R5Y-VV8H].
239
Coglianese & Starobin, supra note 232.
240
Wiener, supra note 237, at 1962.
241
John S. Applegate, The Taming of the Precautionary Principle, 27 WM. & MARY
ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 13, 13 (2002).
242
David M. Driesen, Cost-Benefit Analysis and the Precautionary Principle: Can
they be Reconciled?, 2013 MICH. ST. L. REV. 771, 791-812 (2013). See also Farber, supra
note 152, at 1721-24 (proposing different uses for the precautionary principle and
cost-benefit analysis to avoid key economic uncertainties).
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As such, the precautionary principle applies to climate change
policy,243 because no definitive analysis can adequately capture the
full costs of not taking regulatory measures to mitigate the risks.244
In that vein, and considering that the United States is a party to the
UNFCCC,245 the country remains obliged to reduce GHG emissions,
the impact of which is notoriously difficult to reverse.
Accordingly, the precautionary principle would at least oblige
the United States to achieve its voluntary quota under the Paris
Agreement. Following this line of reasoning, countries should not
move backward in climate change matters. After all, in the case of
climate policy, precaution is largely applicable to placing limitations
on old technologies, such as fossil fuels.246 Furthermore, the world
is beyond precaution now, as “we probably blew past our
precautionary opportunity sometime in the 1980s. We are now, and
have been for some time, in a post-cautionary world.”247
D. The Impact of the U.S. Withdrawal on the International Sphere
This Section addresses the impact of the U.S. withdrawal on the
international sphere and explains its consequences for the country
as well as for climate change governance. The U.S. State Department
emphasizes that, despite the country’s withdrawal of the Paris
Agreement, the U.S. will continue to work to reduce its emissions,
adopting a balanced approach to climate policy and reconciling
economic growth with energy security and lowered pollutants.248
Economic growth and preserving the environment are not
exclusionary goals, as the goals of the UNFCCC exemplify.249 The
243
See Kysar, supra note 156, at 558 (criticizing cost-benefit analysis and its
limitations regarding the pursuit of efficiency in environmental contexts,
specifically on moral foundations).
244
See Dana, supra note 198, at 70. See also Kysar, supra note 156, at 566.
245
UNFCCC, supra note 17, art. 3(3); See Wiener, supra note 197, at 166-68
(emphasizing the need for cost-effectiveness in the application of the precautionary
principle).
246
See Wiener, supra note 197, at 170.
247
See Lisa Heinzerling, Climate Change, Human Health, and the Post-Cautionary
Principle, 96 GEO. L.J. 445, 452 (2008) (advocating for a post-cautionary principle and
its policy implications).
248 Communication Regarding the Intent to Withdraw from the Paris Agreement,
U.S. DEP’T ST. (Aug. 4, 2017), https://www.state.gov/communication-regardingintent-to-withdraw-from-paris-agreement/[https://perma.cc/U7QD-FBPM].
249
Paris Agreement, supra note 6, arts. 4, 6.
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Paris Agreement itself was designed to be exceedingly flexible
regarding its goals and accommodating of new challenges. 250
Experts differ about how much weight the U.S. withdrawal will
carry. Several can see the positives.251 However, the overwhelming
majority contends that U.S. leadership is crucial to expand
cooperation beyond the Paris Agreement.252
Determining the international relevance of the U.S. withdrawal
requires climate governance analysis. The Paris Agreement
established a new system of responsibilities for developed and
developing countries,253 although it does not define which countries
belong to each category. 254 Developed countries should lead by
meeting their absolute emission reduction targets, while developing
countries should reduce their emissions in accordance with their
unique national circumstances. 255 Governments in developing
nations face increasing pressure to achieve economic prosperity,
frequently at the expense of the environment.256 Nonetheless, the
growth of renewable energy has helped displace the once dominant
assumption that economic development and increasing GHG
emissions must be tied.257 Moreover, such countries have greater
incentives to reduce GHGs, due to the likelihood that developing
250 See David G. Victor, America Exits the Climate Stage, BROOKINGS INST. (June
1,
2017),
https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-fromchaos/2017/06/01/america-exits-the-climate-stage/
[https://perma.cc/6PF4CJYM] (“Indeed, the United States, China, France, and others designed Paris so that
it would be highly flexible—able to change in response to new realities, even the
exit of the world’s most powerful nation.”).
251
See Kemp, supra note 4, at 460 (contending that a “rogue” United States
would be worse than its leaving, due to the potential for imploding commitments
from within). This article, however, strongly disagrees, because this “rogue”
United States would not be as publicly scrutinized as the U.S. withdrawal itself.
More significantly, perhaps, is that at least the U.S. monetary commitments to the
Green Climate Fund would be fulfilled.
252
See Victor, supra note 250.
253
Paris Agreement, supra note 6, arts. 4, 9, 10, 13.
254
See Ari & Sari, supra note 1, at 175.
255
Paris Agreement, supra note 6, art. 4(4). The treaty itself does not define
those circumstances.
256
See Andrew Watson Samaan, Enforcement of International Environmental
Treaties: An Analysis, 5 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 261, 272 (1993) (discussing
conflicting policy choices).
257 See Brian Deese, Paris Isn’t Burning: Why the Climate Agreement Will Survive
Trump,
FOREIGN
AFF.
(July/Aug.
2017),
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2017-05-22/paris-isnt-burning
[https://perma.cc/3U59-K6ME] (explaining how reductions in the price of
renewable resources contributed to an increase in the “efficiency of energy
consumption”).
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nations will suffer more from harm related to climate change than
those in the developed world.258 Developed countries have more
resources, and are located primarily in the Northern Hemisphere,
where temperatures are likely to be more temperate than in the
Southern Hemisphere.259
In his announcement, President Trump insisted that China and
India would be allowed to build additional coal plants while the
United States would not be permitted to increase its emissions.260
This is not accurate, as all countries are obligated to establish a target
and to report and evaluate their progress periodically.261 President
Trump also mentioned that the Agreement intruded on U.S.
sovereignty, as over time the targets will increase, while the United
States needed to focus on “unlocking the restrictions on America’s
abundant energy reserves.” 262 The Paris Agreement, despite not
imposing sanctions, encourages all countries to review their targets,
under the assumption that countries will become more ambitious
over time.263 As countries now see the benefits of adopting clean
energy practices, they are more likely to increase their targets to
enable them to profit more from this industry. 264 However, the
United States is unlikely to have such benefits as long as it remains
committed to withdrawing from the Agreement. Therefore,
significant consequences of the United States withdrawal from the
Paris Agreement are the increase of the country’s GHG emissions
and related pollution.
Another adverse consequence of the withdrawal refers to global
climate action. According to the Paris Agreement, which promotes
countries’ review of their targets under external monitoring,
countries review their own targets and overall progress as well as
those of other parties. 265 Civil society also scrutinizes their

POSNER & SYKES, supra note 135, at 232.
See INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, supra note 167, at 7
(finding, with high confidence, that the impact of climate change varies in
accordance with the geographical location and level of development, among other
factors).
260
Trump, supra note 1.
261
Paris Agreement, supra note 6, art. 4(2), 4(3), 4(9), 4(11).
262
Trump, supra note 1.
263
See Hai-Bin et al., supra note 138, at 223.
264 Id.
265
Paris Agreement, supra note 6, art. 3-7.
258
259
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decisions.266 Although emissions targets for each country are quite
different, “the inclusivity of the agreement motivates each country
to scrutinize the performance of others. When participation rates in
social dilemmas are very high or very low, both stigma and honor
are maximized for deviant behavior.”267 Such scrutiny is relevant,
as the outcome is predicated on a global choice architecture system
in which decisions are made by different actors such as consumers,
large corporations, and governments; markets play a significant role
in the system.268 The two primary issues that permit environmental
harm to continue are the presence of incentives that are not properly
aligned, and the absence of feedback on polluting activities.269 This
external monitoring minimizes both challenges, mitigating market
failures.270 Monitoring also generates negative publicity, which is
an effective mechanism to decrease a lack of compliance with
international treaties. 271 Because fear of earning a negative
reputation is used to pressure countries to comply with
international instruments, it is likely the United States will be subject
to this negative repercussion. The current President, however,
seems indifferent to such effect.
More significantly, perhaps, the President’s decision to
withdraw ignores studies estimating that the United States stands to
gain $2 trillion in direct benefits from global environmental action
by 2030. 272 His view also disregards international law and the
principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and respective
capabilities (CBDRRC), which refers specifically to different

266
Paris Agreement, supra note 6, art. 6. See also Jennifer Jacquet & Dale
Jamieson, Soft but Significant Power in the Paris Agreement, 6 NATURE CLIMATE
CHANGE
643,
644
(2016),
https://jenniferjacquet.files.wordpress.com/2010/05/nclimate3006.pdf
[https://perma.cc/A9TL-M9H5] (detailing how civil society may help mobilize
climate action fostering the goals of the Paris Agreement).
267
Jacquet & Jamieson, supra note 266, at 645.
268
RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS
ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS 187 (2009).
269 Id.
270
The introduction to this article discusses the necessity of environmental
regulation due to market failure. See also Stewart, supra note 25, at 172.
271
Samaan, supra note 256, at 274.
272 See Peter Howard & Jason Schwartz, Foreign Action, Domestic Windfall, INST.
FOR POL’Y INTEGRITY 2 (2015) (describing the results from saving on non-incurred
costs of pollution, including health and avoided environmental harms).
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responsibilities allocated among countries.273 Under this principle,
which still binds the United States because it remains party to the
UNFCCC,274 responsibility for current and historical emissions need
to be factored in. 275 The data is clear: from 1800 to 2002, the
developed world contributed more than 80% of GHG emissions.276
As developing states have had a far lesser impact on the current
concentration of GHGs and the overall threshold on carbon
saturation,277 developed countries must provide climate financing to
less developed countries in the terms determined in the Paris
Agreement.278
The United States has contributed the most carbon emissions in
history, 279 yet committed to a rather small financial contribution
under the Paris Agreement.280 The contribution of the parties of the
Paris Agreement finances the Green Climate Fund, which was
established by the Conference of the Parties in 2010 (under the
UNFCCC and as part of the Conventions’ financial mechanism).281
If the United States were to pay the amount it originally agreed to,

273
UNFCCC, supra note 17, art. 3(1) (“The Parties should protect the climate
system for the benefit of present and future generations of humankind, on the basis
of equity and in accordance with their common but differentiated responsibilities
and respective capabilities.”).
274
The United States is a party to the UNFCC. UNITED NATIONS TREATY
COLLECTION,
https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetailsIII.aspx?src=IND&mtdsg_no=XXVII7&chapter=27&Temp=mtdsg3&clang=_en [https://perma.cc/7SKA-TRMA].
275
The principle itself is disputed, because even when costs and benefits are
carefully calculated, and the policy choices and related values are explicit, different
countries may reach different conclusions regarding the optimal level of emission
reduction. See, e.g., Esty & Moffa, supra note 27, at 779.
276
See DONALD A. BROWN, AMERICAN HEAT: ETHICAL PROBLEMS WITH THE
UNITED STATES’ RESPONSE TO GLOBAL WARMING 156 (2002) (stating the United States
is the world leader in cumulative GHG global emissions, with approximately 30%).
277 See, e.g., Gillis & Popovich, supra note 2.
278
Paris Agreement, supra note 6, art. 9. See also Hai-Bin et al., supra note 138,
at 222 (discussing the cumulative impact of developing countries’ emissions).
279
Gillis & Popovich, supra note 2. See also Table 2 in Appendix I (showing
the top emitters of carbon dioxide).
280
See Paris Agreement, supra note 6, art. 9 (outlining the guidelines for
financial contributions).
281
The Green Climate Fund technically aims to finance equal amounts to
mitigation and adaptation initiatives under the UNFCCC. Its initial mobilization
started in 2014, and after the Paris Agreement (2015), it plays a key role in fostering
the goals of such agreement. Green Climate Fund, UNITED NATIONS (Jan. 23, 2019),
https://unfccc.int/process/bodies/funds-and-financial-entities/green-climatefund [https://perma.cc/6SNK-24DH].
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it would be the eleventh highest financing country per capita. 282
However, because the United States suspended its financial
contributions to the Green Climate Fund, 283 the country will
ultimately pay less than $3 per capita.284 For the sake of comparison,
the United Kingdom contributes $18.77 per capita, while Norway,
the highest contributor, pays $50.56. 285 Hence, another major
consequence of the United States withdrawal from the Paris
Agreement is the adverse impact on financing the Green Climate
Fund, which promotes adaptation to climate change as well as the
reduction of GHG emissions in the developing world.286
Additional consequences of the withdrawal are plentiful. In
light of the changes pursued by the Trump administration, scientific
data produced by U.S. researchers regarding climate change may no
longer be available after the withdrawal, which is likely to have an
adverse effect on global data sharing related to climate change.287
Another potential negative effect of the U.S. withdrawal is that the
Paris Agreement provides a mechanism for the development and
transfer of technology.288 Furthermore, other countries rely heavily
on U.S. leadership to reach more ambitious goals.289 U.S. leadership
could push momentum towards curbing emissions (as done under
the previous administration), instead of sponsoring a free-riding
approach.
International cooperation is dynamic and complex, subject to
domestic, international, and supranational interests. It is crucial that
282
See Gillis & Popovich, supra note 2 (explaining the original U.S.
contribution would rank still behind the following nations, if per capita indexes
were considered: Sweden, Luxembourg, Norway, Monaco, Britain, France,
Denmark, Germany, Switzerland, and Japan). For complete data regarding the
pledges of each country, its GDP, and its contribution per capita, see Table 2 in
Appendix I.
283
Trump, supra note 1.
284
Gillis & Popovich, supra note 2. See also Kemp, supra note 4, at 459
(revealing that although the United States pledged to contribute $3 billion, it has
paid only a third of that amount).
285
Additional data involving comparative analysis is available at Table 2 of
Appendix 1.
286
The fund is attentive to the needs of those who are highly vulnerable to the
effects of climate change, specifically in Least Developed Countries (LDCs), Small
Island Developing States (SIDs), and African States. See Green Climate Fund, supra
note 281.
287
If United States scientists do not share their data, global data on the subject
will likely be far less comprehensive. See Davenport & Landler, supra note 73.
288
Paris Agreement, supra note 6, art. 10.
289 Id. arts. 4, 9(3), 9(4).
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actors are consistent in their international behavior. Therefore, it is
no surprise that former UN Chief Ban Ki-Moon claimed that the U.S.
withdrawal would affect climate change and may have a significant
impact on the prospects of the Paris Agreement.290 Experts contend
that it may jeopardize global climate cooperation, specifically on
NDCs.291 Considering the fragility of international cooperation, the
U.S. withdrawal sets a terrible precedent. Even if other countries,
like Australia, merely entertain the possibility of withdrawal,292 that
consideration might be blamed on the United States, as it will be the
first (and, so far, only) country to actually withdraw. Australia’s
behavior provides evidence of a possible domino effect that the U.S.
withdrawal could set in motion because Australia recently relaxed
its emission targets.293
Complicating this scenario is the déjà vu the U.S. withdrawal
would bring to the international order, given its non-ratification of
the Kyoto Protocol.294 Legal scholarship suggests this decision led
to changes in national leadership across the globe, inconsistent
domestic policies, and exacerbation of mutual distrust among
countries.295 Like when local entities take charge of environmental
policies, the U.S. decision not to ratify the Kyoto Protocol increased
the possibility that parties to the treaty would experience leakage,

290
Harini V, U.S. Withdrawal from Paris Agreement May Affect Climate Change:
Former
UN
Chief
Ban
Ki-moon,
CNBC
(July
10,
2018),
https://www.cnbc.com/2018/07/10/i-sincerely-hope-that-the-us-will-comeback-says-ban-ki-moon.html [https://perma.cc/Z3A6-PRV7].
291
See Hai-Bin et al., supra note 138, at 223.
292
Colin Packham & Erin Cooper, Australia Weakens Commitment to Climate
Accord
After
Government
Fractures,
REUTERS
(Aug.
20,
2018),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-climatechange-accord-australia/australiaweakens-commitment-to-climate-accord-after-government-fracturesidUSKCN1L507Y [https://perma.cc/X6MA-XLGR].
293 Id.
294
In 2001, before the Kyoto Protocol entered into force, the United States
Senate, believing the principle of differentiated responsibilities was not in the U.S.
domestic interest, refused to ratify the treaty. See Delali Benjamin K. Dovie &
Shuaib Lwasa, Correlating Negotiation Hotspot Issues, Paris Climate Agreement and the
International Climate Policy Regime, 77 ENVTL. SCI. & POL’Y 1, 2 (2017). On that
occasion, European governments opted to expand the Protocol. The Kyoto Protocol
was negotiated by the Clinton administration and, after the controversial election
of President George W. Bush, environmental protection was no longer a priority.
295
See Lisa Schenck, Climate Change “Crisis”—Struggling for Worldwide
Collective Action, 19 COLO. J. INT’L ENVTL. L. & POL’Y, 319, 328 (2008) (explaining how
a “mutual distrust and threat of leakage hinder an adequate global response to
climate change”).
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seeing their businesses move to unregulated countries.296 Similar
concerns have arisen in relation to the U.S. withdrawal from the
Paris Agreement, as local opposition to global action on climate
change increased.297
The Trump administration’s decision to withdraw is likely to
contribute to anti-U.S. sentiment, as it creates the perception that the
United States would be free-riding. The country’s attempt at freeriding jeopardizes U.S. leadership on a global level, 298 and the
withdrawal could turn the U.S. into a climate pariah. 299 The
withdrawal will enable the United States to emit more pollutants
and reduce its mitigation costs. After the withdrawal, the United
States will begin “squeezing other countries’ emission space and
raising their mitigation costs.” 300 Game theory suggests this
opportunistic behavior may lead to U.S. isolation, and perhaps even
retaliatory actions by other parties to the Paris Agreement. 301 In
addition, it would be unsurprising if non-governmental actors
consider boycotting U.S. products, due to the country’s blatant
disregard for the environment.
Id.
Because of the U.S. withdrawal, the European Union, China, and Canada
face increased domestic opposition, despite being committed to the Paris
Agreement. See Emre Peker, Around the World, Climate Goals Clash with Reality,
WALL STREET J. (Dec. 12, 2018), https://www.wsj.com/articles/around-the-worldclimate-goals-clash-with-reality-11544616000 [https://perma.cc/3EZM-EK6H].
298 See KOH, supra note 9, at 42 (arguing that despite presidential claims that
U.S. leadership has been enhanced, the withdrawal will galvanize China and other
BASIC (Brazil, South Africa, India, China) countries to reinforce their
environmental commitments).
299
Kemp, supra note 4, at 460. Of the top twenty emitting nations, only Iran
and Turkey have not ratified the Paris Agreement. Paris Climate Agreement
Countries 2020, WORLD POPULATION REV. (last visited Apr. 19,2020),
http://worldpopulationreview.com/countries/paris-climate-agreementcountries/ [https://perma.cc/DXE2-VZUX]. Russia has recently ratified the Paris
Agreement, despite limited NDCs. See Alec Luhn, Russia Ratifies Paris Climate
Accord but Targets Are ‘Critically Insufficient’, TELEGRAPH (Sept. 23, 2019),
https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2019/09/23/russia-ratifies-paris-climateaccord-targets-critically-insufficient/ [https://perma.cc/GR2F-JW25].
300
Hai-Bin et al., supra note 138, at 222.
301
This argument assumes that treaties are evidence of true cooperation
among states, rather than representative of interests that coincide. A related
argument is that states would find themselves in a repeated prisoner’s dilemma or
a coordination game. A situation may also develop that involves the retaliation
effect. See, e.g., Mark A. Chinen, Game Theory and Customary International Law: A
Response to Professors Goldsmith and Posner, 23 MICH. J. INT’L L. 143, 160-70 (2001),
https://repository.law.umich.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1337&context=mji
l [https://perma.cc/X66J-FHD3].
296
297
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The absence of the United States as a global player leaves a
leadership vacuum302 that provides an unprecedented opportunity
for China and India to boost their international reputations and soft
power.303 Commentators suggest the U.S. withdrawal is more than
relinquishment of its leadership, as it ultimately enables China to
become the leading player in the energy sector.304 Global warming
itself may bring gains to Russia.305 A few countries wasted no time
in taking action to mitigate the impact of the U.S. decision. 306
Meanwhile, it is clear that U.S. leadership in international matters is
eroding under President Trump due to sudden changes and the
uncertainties they bring. 307 Although this Article focuses on the
Paris Agreement, the U.S. denunciation of the Joint Comprehensive
Plan of Action (or the “Iran deal”), 308 the Trans-Pacific
Partnership,309 and the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty310
302 See KOH, supra note 9, at 42 (arguing that despite presidential claims that
U.S. leadership has been enhanced, the withdrawal will galvanize China and other
BASIC (Brazil, South Africa, India, China) countries to reinforce their
environmental commitments).
303
Kemp, supra note 4, at 460.
304
McCarthy, supra note 220.
305
See POSNER & SYKES, supra note 135, at 231-232 (explaining that territory
currently frozen would be accessible).
306
On June 1, 2017, French President Emmanuel Macron introduced a
program for domestic and international researchers, graduate students, and postdocs to develop studies on climate change. The English name of this initiative is
“Make our Planet Great Again,” which obviously alludes to Donald Trump’s
campaign slogan.
Make Our Planet Great Again, CAMPUS FR. (2017),
https://www.campusfrance.org/en/make-our-planet-great-again-en
[https://perma.cc/4WPR-HKTU].
307
The United States was unable to exert influence at COP 23, and is currently
the only UN member who is soon to be out of the Paris Agreement. See Cooper,
supra note 5, at 450.
308
Donald J. Trump, President of the U.S., Remarks by President Trump on
the
Joint
Comprehensive
Plan
of
Action
(May
8,
2018),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trumpjoint-comprehensive-plan-action/
[https://perma.cc/CC7F-8BDG].
This
controversial condemnation also appears to be unreasoned, considering the
misleading statements in the President’s remark.
309
DONALD J. TRUMP, PRESIDENTIAL MEMORANDUM REGARDING WITHDRAWAL
OF THE UNITED STATES FROM THE TRANS-PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP NEGOTIATIONS AND
AGREEMENT (Jan. 23, 2017), https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidentialactions/presidential-memorandum-regarding-withdrawal-united-states-transpacific-partnership-negotiations-agreement/[https://perma.cc/3K7Y-AFGC].
310
The current administration withdrew from this Agreement with Russia,
despite its previous praise for the treaty, which was signed by President Reagan.
For a limited justification of the withdrawal, see Donald J. Trump, Remarks by

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository,

932

U. Pa. J. Int'l L.

[Vol. 41:4

all demonstrate that choices made by this administration occur with
little notice, involve limited, if any, reasoning, and are considered
contentious by the international community. The choice to
withdraw from the Paris Agreement being similar, it will likely
cause similar reactions across the world, further eroding US power.
The lack of U.S. leadership has put more pressure on the United
Nations, which has been actively pursuing environmental
protection and seeking ways to reduce the impact of climate change.
The UN Security Council recently recognized climate change as a
“threat multiplier,” as climate-related risks and conflicts are already
a reality for millions of people around the globe, threatening peace
and security. 311 As part of its 2030 Agenda for Sustainable
Development, the UN created the Sustainable Development Goals
(SDGs), which are meant to serve as an urgent call to action to
citizens across the globe.312 Although all member states adopted the
Agenda in 2015, and consequently are meant to uphold the SDGs,
the U.S. withdrawal from the Paris Agreement conflicts with those
stated goals.
Despite global efforts and policies to mitigate climate change, it
remains to be seen whether other countries will continue to comply
with the Paris Agreement after the United States withdraws. The
withdrawal is perceived as undermining the legitimacy of the
agreement and jeopardizing the effectiveness of climate change
governance.313 It is possible that countries will elect to sign on to the
Agreement or decide to make their voluntary compliance more
effective. India’s compliance with its NDCs, despite the upcoming
U.S. withdrawal, provides evidence that other countries may follow

President Trump Before Air Force One Departure (Oct. 20, 2018),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trumpair-force-one-departure-4/ [https://perma.cc/SM35-43NK].
311 See Climate Change Recognized as ‘Threat Multiplier’, UN Security Council
NEWS
(Jan.
25,
2019),
Debates
its
Impact
on
Peace,
UN
https://news.un.org/en/story/2019/01/1031322
[https://perma.cc/URH4V6VL] (discussing desertification and food and energy security).
312
Of the seventeen principles, Goal 7 (affordable and clean energy) and Goal
13 (climate action) are particularly relevant to the topic at hand. They demonstrate
the need for all countries—developed and developing nations alike—to commit to
effective and responsible actions to protect the environment and curb global
warming.
See Sustainable Development Goals, UNITED NATIONS (2015),
https://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/sustainable-development-goals/
[https://perma.cc/J7VH-8HAT].
313
Hai-Bin et al., supra note 138, at 222.
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this route.314 Meanwhile, Australia’s behavior, ultimately electing
not to comply with its original NDCs, indicates other parties may
refuse to be bound to their targets.315
The latter scenario becomes much direr when considering that
President Trump’s decision may mean the world misses its one
window of opportunity regarding climate change mitigation, 316
particularly as research shows the ten years after the Paris
Agreement are crucial for achieving its targets. 317 Mitigation is
vital, 318 because it is the only way to reduce carbon emissions
effectively.319 A recent study by Nobel Laureate William Nordhaus
concludes that limited global action on climate change means the
reduction of 2°C is unattainable, and the need for policies to slow
climate change is growing more pressing.320 The U.S. withdrawal
not only hinders the country’s ability to maintain its leadership
position in the global arena, but—more significantly—possibly
hampers the possibility of taking meaningful global action on
climate change. Regardless, should the United States withdraw
from the Paris Agreement, a race to the bottom will have begun,
exposing all to the extreme consequences of global warming in a
manner that certainly will not improve the overall well-being of
either U.S. residents or those residing elsewhere on the planet.
IV. CONCLUSION
This Article finds that the U.S. withdrawal from the Paris
Agreement is not justified under the rigorous cost-benefit analysis
314
Annie Gowen & Simon Denyer, As U.S. Backs Away from Climate Pledges,
POST
(June
1,
2017),
India
and
China
Step
Up,
WASH.
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/as-us-backs-away-fromclimate-pledges-india-and-china-step-up/2017/06/01/59ccb494-16e4-4d47-a881c5bd0922c3db_story.html [https://perma.cc/E4RA-J9LM].
315
Packham & Cooper, supra note 292.
316
The urgency of climate change action was a significant factor addressed in
the Paris Agreement, and there was international consensus about it. See Morgan
et al., supra note 36, at 9.
317
Hai-Bin et al., supra note 138, at 223.
318
WB, supra note 182, at 2.
319
SOVACOOL ET AL., supra note 144, at 184.
320
William Nordhaus, Projections and Uncertainties About Climate Change in an
Era of Minimal Climate Policies, 10 AM. ECON. J. 333, 358 (2018),
https://pubs.aeaweb.org/doi/pdfplus/10.1257/pol.20170046
[https://perma.cc/DA8T-RCCK].
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test outlined therein. First, the manner in which this decision was
reached was evaluated, focusing on its procedural terms. This
assessment shows the current administration did not make a
reasoned decision regarding the U.S. withdrawal from the Paris
Agreement, and illustrates how the withdrawal abruptly departs
from previously reasoned regulatory action. The absence of a
scientific advisor, the lack of sound science, and lobbying efforts are
considered factors indicative of unreasoned action. The Article
analyzes the existing litigation on the Paris Agreement,
contextualizing its potential increase after the withdrawal. Current
trends involving such litigation, which are unveiled in this Article,
provide evidence of such an increase. The legal uncertainty
provoked by the intended withdrawal indicates transaction costs for
the involved parties are increasing and will likely continue to do so.
Second, this Article assesses the costs and benefits of the policy
decision itself, concentrating on the merits (substantive terms) of the
withdrawal.
It addressed the pertinent challenges for this
assessment and discussed the domestic costs and arguable benefits
of the U.S. withdrawal. This analysis finds that subnational units
are unfit substitutes for national climate policy. The Article shows
how the withdrawal will create more costs than benefits for the
United States in the medium and long term, while the limited shortterm benefits will be restricted to the coal-industry. Moreover, these
so-called “benefits” are unlikely to be actual gains, as the
withdrawal disregarded the social cost of carbon and the divested
investments on renewable energy. The estimated strong impact of
the withdrawal on the GDP demonstrates how it is detrimental to
the U.S. economy. This shows President Trump’s decision does not
maximize overall well-being.
Furthermore, this Article establishes that the U.S. withdrawal
has and will continue to have an adverse global impact. It lessens
the country’s leadership role in the international arena, which will
take several years to recover, and may prove detrimental to
immediate trade considerations. More significantly, the withdrawal
may cost the United States, and the world, to miss out on a narrow
window of opportunity to combat climate change. Consequently,
the United States and the rest of the international community are
potentially more susceptible to the devastating consequences of
climate change.
Finally, as the U.S. withdrawal from the Paris Agreement does
not pass the cost-benefit analysis test, it demonstrates that the
United States should remain in the Agreement and continue to be a
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leading force in reducing carbon emissions and mitigating the
effects of climate change. The criticism regarding the withdrawal
will continue alongside the desire for climate change being taken
seriously. Harshly dismissing climate change as a Chinese
invention and announcing his intention to withdraw from the Paris
Agreement, as President Trump did, is unreasoned. It does not
maximize the overall well-being of U.S. residents, it adversely
impacts global action on climate change, and ultimately fails the
comprehensive cost-benefit analysis conducted in this Article.
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APPENDIX I: FIGURES
CHART 1: GLOBAL CARBON DIOXIDE EMISSIONS IN 2016321
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India, 6%

China, 28%

U.S.A, 15%
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321
This chart was developed by the author based on the carbon emissions of
fossil combustiles during 2016. See IEA Atlas of Energy, INT’L ENERGY AGENCY (2016),
http://energyatlas.iea.org/#!/tellmap/1378539487
[https://perma.cc/G8NT4K48]. For per capita emissions, see Table 2.
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TABLE 1: CARBON DIOXIDE PRODUCED PER TYPE OF FUEL322
Fuel Type

Pounds of CO2 emitted
(per million BTU)

Coal (anthracite)

228.6

Coal (bituminous)

205.7

Coal (lignite)

215.4

Coal (subbituminous)

214.3

Diesel fuel and heating oil

161.3

Gasoline (without ethanol)

157.2

Propane

139.0

Natural Gas

117.0

TABLE 2: CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE GREEN FUND BY COUNTRY AND
EMISSIONS PER CAPITA323
Contributor

Announced
(Millions,
USD)

Signed
Per Capita

GDP
Per Capita
(K)

Australia
Austria
Belgium
Bulgaria
Canada
Chile
Colombia
Cyprus
Czech Republic
Denmark
Estonia
Finland

187
34.8
66.9
0.10
277
0.30
0.30
0.47
5.32
71.8
1.30
107

7.92
4.01
6.18
0.02
7.79
0.02
<0.01
0.40
0.57
12.73
0.99
19.40

62
51
48
8
50
15
8
27
20
61
20
50

Emissions
Per Capita
(Rounded
metric tons
per capita)
17
8
9
7
14
5
2
7
10
7
14
10

322
Frequently Asked Questions: How Much Carbon Dioxide is Produced When
Different Fuels Are Burned, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (last reviewed June 4, 2019),
https://www.eia.gov/tools/faqs/faq.php?id=73&t=11 [https://perma.cc/H798CVV8].
323 Status of Pledges and Contributions Made to the Green Climate Fund, GREEN
CLIMATE FUND (Feb. 3, 2020), https://www.greenclimate.fund/how-wework/resource-mobilization [https://perma.cc/9UNR-LVQB].
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France
Germany
Hungary
Iceland
Indonesia
Ireland
Italy
Japan
Latvia
Liechtenstein
Lithuania
Luxembourg
Malta
Mexico
Monaco
Mongolia
Netherlands
New Zealand
Norway
Panama
Peru
Poland
Portugal
Rep. of Korea
Romania
Spain
Sweden
Switzerland
United
Kingdom
United States
Vietnam
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1035
1003
4.30
1.00
0.30
10.7
317.5
1,500
0.50
0.10
0.10
46.8
0.60
10.0
2.30
0.1
133.8
2.6
272.2
1.00
6.00
0.10
2.70
100
0.10
160.5
581.2
100
1,211

15.64
12.40
0.43
2.10
<0.01
0.58
4.54
11.80
0.24
1.48
0.04
58.63
0.70
0.08
28.89
0.02
7.94
0.57
50.56
0.25
0
<0.01
0.26
1.99
<0.01
3.46
59.31
12.21
18.77

43
48
14
52
4
53
35
36
16
135
16
111
23
10
163
4
52
42
97
12
7
14
22
28
10
30
59
85
46

5
9
5
6
2
8
7
9
4
1
5
21
6
4
–
7
10
7
9
3
2
8
5
12
4
6
6
5
7

3000
1.00

9.41
–

55
2

17
2

